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Law and Economics After Behavioral Economics 
Grant M. Hayden* & Stephen E. Ellis** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic theory is a sort of distilled common sense: it draws out the 
implications of the view that people act to best get what they want, given 
what they believe about their circumstances.  That basic insight is used to 
build mathematical models that are intended to explain and predict 
human behavior.  Those models are useful in many ways—most 
centrally, they allow us to structure incentives in order to achieve 
important ends.1  Structuring incentives on any kind of large scale is a 
job for governments, and the tool they use is the law.  Thus, it should 
come as no surprise that lawmakers have looked to economic theory for 
guidance.  And, indeed, the law and economics movement has become, 
by almost any measure, the most dominant school of legal thought in the 
last half a century.2 
But there is sufficient reason to conclude that economic theory, as it 
stands, is flawed.  While economic models have had their successes, a 
large and growing body of empirical evidence reveals that people often 
fail to live up to the rational-actor ideal of standard economics.3  Real 
people, it turns out, use mental shortcuts.  They display systematic biases 
when they make judgments.  And they occasionally take actions that 
conflict with their interests, in both the long and short term.  As a result, 
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 1. There is some debate about what those ends should be.  Normally, we try to maximize 
people’s ability to get what they want, on the assumption that they know their own needs.  In certain 
cases, however, we seek to discourage the pursuit of certain ends, e.g., heroin-induced stupors. 
 2. E.g., Francesco Parisi, Introduction to THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW: THE 
COLLECTED ECONOMIC ESSAYS OF RICHARD A. POSNER, at ix, xxxii (Francesco Parisi ed., 2000); 
Thomas S. Ulen, A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other) Additions to the Law School and 
Law and Economics Curricula, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35, 36 (2004).  See generally RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003) (applying economic theory to virtually every 
field of law); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004) (same). 
 3. See infra Parts II.B, III.A (discussing this failure and the emergence of behavioral 
economics). 
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the behavior of real people is often at odds with that predicted by 
standard economic theory. 
Social scientists respond to this evidence in a variety of ways.  
Economists usually stick with their standard tools and attempt to explain 
the anomalous empirical results by reference to some overlooked input 
(some new belief, for example) or by applying the models in new ways.4  
Sufficiently subtle application of economic analysis, they claim, can 
account for the troublesome cases.  Behavioral economists accept 
standard consumer theory as both a normative benchmark and a rough 
approximation of the relevant causal mechanisms of behavior, but 
propose new models meant to capture the way behavior deviates from 
the standard account.5  These models retain the basic structure of 
economic theory while replacing its simple mathematical representations 
of belief and desire with alternatives that better fit the evidence. 
In the last decade, legal scholars have taken up the cause and 
incorporated behavioral economics into their study of the law.  Some 
have carried out empirical research involving legal situations that 
confirm or, in some cases, suggest further refinements to behavioral 
models.  Others take the behavioral models as given, and use them to 
make suggestions about specific areas of the law (such as contract law) 
or to argue broader normative points (such as the proper scope of 
governmental paternalism).  As a result, much of the work of fleshing out 
the findings of behavioral economics is now being done in law schools 
rather than departments of economics. 
But behavioral economics and its legal incarnation are not without 
problems of their own.  Chief among these is the fact that, unlike 
standard economics, behavioral economics has not coalesced into a 
unified theory of behavior.  At its core is a collection of psychological 
phenomena—norms, biases, and heuristics—connected only in the sense 
that each runs counter to some fundamental tenet of traditional rational-
actor economics.  Some have charged, we think unfairly, that behavioral 
economics is nothing more than this collection.  Like many 
exaggerations, however, this one contains a grain of truth.  Behavioral 
economists generally do just build the data into their models.  Where, for 
example, behavior seems risk averse for gains and risk loving for losses, 
behavioral accounts posit motivational structures (e.g., wants, interests, 
values) that are risk averse for gains and risk loving for losses.  And 
where behavior seems to reflect an overemphasis on low probability 
                                                     
 4. See infra Part II.C (discussing the response by law and economics to these challenges). 
 5. See infra Part III.A (discussing these new models in the context of behavioral economics). 
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events, behavioral accounts posit belief structures that overweight low 
probabilities.  The result of this straightforward approach is a set of data-
driven modifications for standard economic models.  To the extent that 
the empirical evidence allows, behavioral economics adopts standard 
economics as it is. 
Behavioral economists usually appeal to only one or two 
modifications to account for a given behavioral regularity.  For example, 
in order to explain the unexpected failure of parties to bargain around 
court orders, behavioral economists point to both the endowment effect 
and to the role of fairness norms.6  This raises a number of problems.  
The appeal to different sets of modifications gives individually plausible 
but jointly inconsistent (and irreconcilable) explanations for a particular 
bit of behavior.  Moreover, where only a single modification of an 
orthodox model suffices to capture the data, are the other psychological 
features absent, and, if so, why? 
The lack of a unified theory also makes it harder to figure out how 
behavioral and standard economics fit together.  There are many 
instances where standard accounts seem to get things right.  Are people 
rational, self-interested maximizers only some of the time, and, if so, 
when?  These issues show how difficult it is to translate the teachings of 
behavioral economics into positive law, if for no other reason than it is 
difficult to convince policymakers to rely upon relatively isolated, 
apparently intermittent, features of human behavior.7 
This issue has not gone unnoticed by those in behavioral law and 
economics.  In his introduction to the leading book in the field, Cass 
Sunstein notes: 
 Behavioral law and economics is in its very early stages, and an 
enormous amount remains to be done.  Some of the outstanding 
questions are foundational and involve the nature of economics itself: 
Can behavioral economics generate a unitary theory of behavior, or is it 
an unruly collection of effects?  Is it too ad hoc and unruly to generate 
predictions in the legal context?  As compared with approaches based  
 
                                                     
 6. See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of various 
functions to appeal to fairness norms). 
 7. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should not 
Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) 
(arguing that law and economics’ assumptions of perfect rationality and behavioral law and 
economics’ assumptions of perfect irrationality are both flawed—neither accurately reflect the state 
of the empirical research nor form an adequate basis for legal prescriptions). 
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on ordinary rationality assumptions, does behavioral economics neglect 
the value of parsimony?8 
Despite the wealth of empirical work, there has been surprisingly little 
done in the way of answering these fundamental questions.  Behavioral 
economists resolutely focus on the trees with very little attention to the 
forest, and, as a result, they have failed to develop a single, consistent 
account of economic behavior, one that allows them to fit the various 
behavioral heuristics and biases together and to integrate them with 
successful standard economic models.  Until this failure is rectified, it is 
unlikely that behavioral economics will capture the full attention of legal 
academics, and, more importantly, legal policymakers. 
A primary reason for the failure of behavioral economics to confront 
important questions is its continued unreflective reliance on the basic 
economic paradigm.  Indeed, the usual behavioral methods for 
accommodating the empirical evidence take the basic economic account 
as canonical.  Accept, reject, or tinker with the functional forms, most 
standard and behavioral economists confine themselves to thinking about 
the particular elements of common sense that originally inspired 
economic models. 
There is, however, another approach.  Economic theory (and its 
successors) might be too distilled—after all, there is much more to our 
common-sense theory of behavior than the claim that people act to get 
what they want.  There may be more to the story of human motivation 
than just desires and beliefs.  Recognizing this possibility allows us to 
step back and look to common sense for additional resources to enhance 
economic models in an idea-driven, “top down” fashion, as opposed to a 
data-driven, “bottom up” way. 
This Article will discuss one such approach, presenting an additional 
element to the basic desire-belief apparatus that underlies economic 
theory.  The idea, in a nutshell, is that people normally consider their 
circumstances from a particular (more or less narrow) perspective.  As a 
result, they act on proper subsets of their beliefs and desires that reflect 
their take on their situations.9  In other words, people do not have all of 
their desires and beliefs “online” at all times, motivating their behavior.  
This approach has the advantage of being readily integrated into standard 
                                                     
 8. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 9 (Cass R. 
Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 9. As we will see, the subset of a person’s mental states that she uses to think about a situation 
constitutes her understanding of that situation. 
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economic theory and is capable of shedding crucial light on many of the 
situations that give standard accounts trouble (and give rise to behavioral 
alternatives).  As such, it is a step in the direction of a more unified 
theory of human behavior. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II critically examines the 
current state of the law and economics movement.  Despite some early 
successes, the movement—or, more precisely, the standard economic 
theory upon which it’s based—is under attack for oversimplifying certain 
aspects of human nature and, more importantly, for a growing list of 
empirical shortcomings.  And while a sympathetic reading of economic 
theory shows that it can overcome some of these criticisms, there are 
significant empirical results that are beyond its explanatory power.  Part 
III of the Article considers whether behavioral law and economics is up 
to the task.  Behavioral economics takes standard economics as its 
departure point, but then proposes its own models expressly designed 
around the anomalous empirical data.  Unfortunately, this bottom-up 
approach leaves behavioral economics without the unifying conceptual 
framework necessary to sort out various behavioral effects, reconcile 
them with successful standard accounts, or form a firm basis for legal 
policymaking.  Finally, Part IV of the Article proposes an addition to the 
basic desire-belief framework that underlies all economic models, both 
standard and behavioral, in order to develop the unified framework 
necessary for successful lawmaking. 
II. LAW AND ECONOMICS 
A. Economic Theory and the Rise of Law and Economics 
Standard economic theory has its roots in our normal, everyday 
theory about how people act (what philosophers often call “folk 
psychology”).  The basic elements of the theory are desires and beliefs, 
and the central relationship between the two is that people act to fulfill 
their desires given what they believe about their situation.10  While this is 
primarily a normative account—we think that such actions make sense in 
an important way, so people should so act11—we usually assume that 
                                                     
 10. This is, for example, Richard Posner’s basic line on rationality.  POSNER, supra note 2, at 
17; Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1551, 1551 (1998). 
 11. To act on this norm is to act rationally in a particular sense.  “Rational” is a term of 
approval, commendation, or endorsement.  To say that something is rational is to say that it makes 
sense in some way.  E.g., ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 6–7 (1990).  Instrumental 
rationality, the sort of rationality involved in economics, is primarily concerned with the fitness of 
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people approximate the norm.  The idea that people act to get what they 
want, given what they believe, plays an important role in how we 
navigate the world.12  Economic theories are really just ways of 
formalizing (or better, regimenting) this core principle.  The rational 
choice account of behavior that underwrites modern economics is, as 
David Lewis masterfully puts it, “a systematic exposition of the 
consequences of certain well-chosen platitudes about belief, desire, 
preference, and choice.  It is the very core of our common-sense theory 
of persons, dissected out and elegantly systematized.”13  The desires, 
attractions, and aversions of common sense are all aggregated into the 
preference rankings of rational choice economics (and these preference 
rankings are numerically represented by utility functions).14  Beliefs 
about available actions, surrounding circumstances, and other people are 
all modeled with subjective probability functions.  Choice of action is 
treated as the result of subjective expected utility maximization (that is, 
the action chosen is one with the highest probability-weighted average 
utility).  In standard economic accounts, all of a person’s wants 
(interests, values, etc.) are reflected in her utility function.  Likewise, all 
of her beliefs (judgments, hunches, etc.) are reflected in her subjective 
probabilities.  Actions, then, are understood as the result of a person’s 
whole mind. 
The common sense at the core of economics helps to explain its 
influence.  While most people can’t be bothered with the mathematical 
                                                                                                                       
actions to wants.  A person’s desires are treated as the baseline for evaluating her behavior, and 
actions are commended when they advance the objects of those wants.  This is a conditional 
commendation—if the actor has appropriate desires then the action makes sense.  Saying that 
something is instrumentally rational is, however, a strong commendation.  An instrumentally 
rational action is a good way to achieve an agent’s ends, whatever they are.  Instrumental rationality 
applies derivatively to actors and choices.  An instrumentally rational agent is one who takes 
instrumentally rational actions.  Someone might be instrumentally rational in general or on a 
particular occasion.  An instrumentally rational choice is one made on the grounds that it is a best 
(good) way to achieve an end.  It picks actions for each set of ends in each circumstance—the 
actions that best satisfy those ends—and so defines a correspondence between situations (as 
represented by beliefs) and actions.  Once the correspondence is defined, we can ask if people 
actually act in accordance with it. 
 12. We use the desire-belief framework to help predict the behavior of others, even of complete 
strangers.  For example, we think that another driver doesn’t want to be seriously hurt, that she 
knows there is a truck near, and that pulling out in front of the truck runs the risk of death or serious 
injury; so we conclude that she won’t pull out.  Such predictions are usually pretty close to the mark.  
We also use the principle to form judgments about the characters of others.  We think of our 
neighbor, for instance, that he saw that his wife was uncomfortable with his story; that he went 
ahead and told it anyway; we conclude, therefore, that he must not care much about her feelings 
(jerk!). 
 13. 1 DAVID LEWIS, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 114 (1983). 
 14. The way in which different attractions fit together to guide actions in various circumstances 
is not well-understood.  See Stephen Ellis, Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory 
of Human Action, 153 SYNTHESE 313, 315–16 (2006). 
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models themselves, they retain their intuitive appeal because they are a 
“scientized” version of normal psychology.15  Thus, it should not have 
been surprising when it was “discovered” that the common law appeared 
to be driven by an underlying economic logic.  Nonetheless, the law and 
economics movement expended much of its early energy examining the 
many instances in which the common law appears to maximize allocative 
efficiency.16  Sometimes, the common law did so quite explicitly, as with 
the Learned Hand formula for negligence liability.17  More often, 
however, judges appeared to come to decisions that implicitly comported 
with the dictates of economics.  For example, the defense of 
impossibility in contract law, which excuses nonperformance under a 
contract when intervening events render performance physically or 
legally impossible, tends to promote efficiency by assigning liability to 
the party who could avoid or spread the risk of the intervening events at 
the least cost.18  Similar claims of efficiency were made with respect to a 
rather wide range of doctrines from salvage awards in admiralty19 to the 
degrees of homicide in criminal law20 to the limited scope of the right to 
privacy.21  “It is,” notes Richard Posner, “as if the judges wanted to adopt 
the rules, procedures, and case outcomes that would maximize society’s 
wealth.”22 
Law and economics scholars spent a good bit of time attempting to 
come up with an explanation for this “efficiency hypothesis.”23  Perhaps, 
it was argued, inefficient legal rules were subject to more numerous and 
                                                     
 15. In emphasizing the common-sense roots of economic theory, we don’t mean to deny that it 
can be used to explain puzzles or make novel predictions.  It isn’t obvious, for example, that rap 
stars (or lawyers) will make more money than middle school teachers (or philosophers).  Still, appeal 
to economic principles can help explain this fact. 
 16. POSNER, supra note 2, at 25; id. at 249–56; Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G. Medema, 
Schools of Thought in Law and Economics: A Kuhnian Competition, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW 
AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 65, 71–75 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995); 
Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287–91 
(1979). 
 17. Judge Hand explained tort liability on the basis of a mathematical cost benefit analysis: 
“[I]f the probability [of the accident] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of adequate 
precautions], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < 
PL.”  United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 18. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in 
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89–92 (1977). 
 19. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other 
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 100–05 (1978). 
 20. POSNER, supra note 2, at 233–35. 
 21. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978) 
(examining the economic theory behind the withholding or concealment of information). 
 22. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 356 (1990). 
 23. For a brief discussion of the various theories, see Mercuro & Medema, supra note 16, at 
72–73. 
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intense legal challenges because parties had greater incentives to replace 
them with efficient rules (and the inefficient rules were thus driven out of 
the common law).24  Or maybe parties sought alternative forums for 
resolving disputes, such as arbitration, in situations where legal rules 
consistently led to inefficient allocations (and the common law thus 
competes with other systems of dispute resolution).25  Or perhaps judges 
are just naturally drawn to rules that promote efficiency.26  To this day, 
there is no generally accepted theory as to why the common law 
promotes economic efficiency.  But given that the nature of the law is to 
provide generalized rules to govern human behavior, it is no surprise that 
law and economics was such a fruitful match; the only real question is 
why it took so long for the two to find each other. 
B. Challenges to Law and Economics 
Despite its intuitive appeal and breadth of support in the law and 
elsewhere, economic theory is controversial.  A number of social 
scientists—psychologists, sociologists, and even other economists—
argue that standard economic accounts fail to adequately explain or 
predict human action.  The criticisms fall into two broad areas.  The first 
holds that economic theory is too stripped-down.  It doesn’t even pass 
the “sniff test” because it ignores certain important behavioral inputs—
things like mistakes, compulsions, social norms, and roles—and instead 
appeals to such alien notions as utility and efficiency.  Economist David 
Kreps captures the people-aren’t-like-that feel of this objection when he 
notes: 
 These models of consumer and firm behavior typically strike people 
as fairly obnoxious.  We don’t find consumers strolling down the aisles 
of supermarkets consulting a utility function to maximize when making 
their choices, nor do we typically think of business executives being 
guided completely and solely (or even mainly) by the effect of their 
decisions on business profits.27 
                                                     
 24. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 492–96 (1988); POSNER, supra 
note 22, at 360. 
 25. Mercuro & Medema, supra note 16, at 72. 
 26. See id. at 74 (“Posner even goes so far as to suggest that these efficient doctrines simply 
reflect common sense, and that while the articulation of these doctrines in formal economic 
terminology lies beyond the capacity of most judges, the common sensical intuition does not.”  
(citing POSNER, supra note 2, at 254–55)). 
 27. DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 4 (1990). 
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Despite its common-sense roots, standard economic theory is just too 
sterile, the claim goes, to capture the full range of motivations behind 
human behavior.  Real people aren’t much like Homo economicus, so the 
latter makes a poor model for the former. 
The second area of criticism points to the empirical shortcomings of 
orthodox economic theory: its predictions often fail to come true.  There 
are a host of situations where people behave in ways that seem to be 
inconsistent with subjective expected utility maximization.28  There is 
evidence, for example, that people switch their preferences over 
outcomes when those outcomes are described in different ways.  The 
following case from Kahneman and Tversky is representative: 
Problem 1 . . . : Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of 
an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.  Two 
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.  
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the 
programs are as follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  . . . 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people 
will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.  
. . . 
Which of the two programs would you favor? 
. . . Now consider another problem in which the same cover story is 
followed by a different description of the prospects associated with the 
two programs: 
                                                     
 28. Take, for example, the famous Allais paradox, which was the first well-known case to cast 
doubts on rational choice accounts. 
• Problem 1.  Choose between options A and B: A pays $2500 with 
probability 0.33, $2400 with probability 0.66, and $0 with probability 
0.01; B pays $2400 with probability 1. 
• Problem 2.  Choose between options C and D: C pays $2500 with 
probability 0.33 and $0 with probability 0.67; D pays $2400 with 
probability 0.34 and $0 with probability 0.66. 
In Problem 1, A is preferred to B if and only if 0.33u($2500) + 0.66u($2400) + 0.01u($0) > 
u($2400), i.e., u($0) > 34u($2400) – 33u($2500).  Likewise, in Problem 2, C is preferred to D if and 
only if 0.33u($2500) + 0.67u($0) > 0.34u($2400) + 0.66u($0), i.e., u($0) > 34u($2400) – 
33u($2500).  A person who chooses A and D together, or B and C together, therefore behaves in a 
way that is inconsistent with utility theory.  In experiments involving these sorts of problems, 
however, most subjects choose B and C together.  See Robert Sudgen, How People Choose, in THE 
THEORY OF CHOICE 36, 37–38 (Shaun Hargreaves Heap et al. eds., 1992) (displaying and discussing 
part of an experiment from which this example is taken).  The case originally comes from Par M. 
Allais, LE COMPORTEMENT DE L’HOMME RATIONNEL DEVANT LE RISQUE: CRITIQUE DES 
POSTULATS ET AXIOMES DE L’ÉCOLE AMÉRICAINE, 21 ECONOMETRICA 503, 527 (1953). 
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Problem 2 . . . : If program C is adopted, 400 people will die.  . . . 
If program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody 
will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.  . . . 
Which of the two programs would you favor?29 
Program A in Problem 1 and program C in Problem 2 are 
indistinguishable in real terms, as are program B in Problem 1 and 
program D in Problem 2.30  By measuring the outcomes of the programs 
in terms of the number of lives saved, Problem 1 adopts as an implicit 
reference point a situation where the disease has already taken its toll of 
600 lives.31  In Problem 2, however, the program outcomes are measured 
by the number of lives lost, which implies a reference state where no one 
has yet died of the disease.32  When given these “two” problems (with a 
few other problems in between to cleanse their palates), a clear majority 
of respondents preferred option A in the first problem (72%) and option 
D in the second (78%).33  In this case, people are risk averse when the 
problem is described in terms of gains and risk seeking when it is 
described in terms of losses.  But according to subjective expected utility 
theory, when counting lives (as with anything else), ((x-600)+200) = (x-
400), so u((x-600)+200) = u(x-400) also holds.  Likewise, (1/3((x-
600)+600)+2/3(x-600)) = (1/3x+2/3(x-600)), so u(1/3((x-600)+600)+2/3(x-
600)) = u(1/3x+2/3(x-600)) should also follow.  These equalities, 
combined with the experimental data, lead to the absurd conclusion that 
u((x-600)+200) > u(1/3((x-600)+600)+2/3(x-600)) = u(1/3x+2/3(x-600)) > 
u(x-400) = u((x-600)+200).  Something is clearly amiss!34 
There is evidence of exactly these sorts of description-dependent 
preferences in the stock market.  Standard economic theory holds that 
you should sell a stock if you think it will fall in price and keep it if you 
think it will rise, regardless of the purchase price (a sunk cost).  There is 
evidence, however, of a disposition effect—people will hold on to losing 
stocks longer than they hold on to winning stocks, even when the rate of 
                                                     
 29. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
341, 343 (1984). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 343 (“Respondents confronted with their conflicting answers are typically 
puzzled.  Even after rereading the problems, they still wish to be risk averse in the ‘lives saved’ 
version; they wish to be risk seeking in the ‘lives lost’ version; and they also wish to obey invariance 
and give consistent answers in the two versions.”). 
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return on the unsold losers was smaller than the rate of return on the 
winners after sale.35  On an aggregate scale, the trading volume of 
winning stocks is higher than that for losing stocks.36  It appears that 
people are more willing to gamble on their losers turning around than on 
their winners staying on track. 
Preference changes resulting from what are merely different 
descriptions or sunk costs are obviously a serious issue—common sense 
or not, utility theory is in trouble if it doesn’t explain behavior.  None of 
this evidence, by the way, surprises the “sniff test” critics: if utility 
theory misses determinants of behavior, empirical inadequacy is to be 
expected. 
Partisans of behavioral economics in the field of law incorporate 
elements of both sorts of criticisms.  Standard economic models, they 
argue, naïvely focus on Homo economicus rather than real people.  Real 
people are not utility-maximizing automatons, but instead “can be said to 
display bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-
interest.”37  Cass Sunstein goes a step further, and explicitly appeals to 
norms and roles in order to replace preferences in explaining certain 
behaviors in a legal context.38  The argument here is that standard 
economics involves fundamental misdescriptions of people and their 
motivations. 
The primary criticism, however, focuses on empirical difficulties.  
For example, legal scholars appeal to evidence of description-dependent 
evaluation in order to explain why bargaining doesn’t replace court 
judgments to a greater extent than it does.39  People seem risk averse 
when they see a situation as a potential significant gain and risk loving 
when they see it as a potential significant loss.  Since defendants are 
likely to see themselves as potential losers (and plaintiffs often see 
themselves as potential losers from the standpoint of their pre-injury 
status), litigants (sometimes on both sides) are often willing to “roll the 
                                                     
 35. Terrance Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, 53 J. FIN. 1775, 1775–
79 (1998). 
 36. Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in CHOICES, 
VALUES, AND FRAMES 288, 290–91 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Odean, supra 
note 35, at 1775–79. 
 37. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1476 (1998). 
 38. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 135, 138–39 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). 
 39. Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1497–504; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1051, 1103–13 (2000). 
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dice” on a trial.40  Traditional law and economics also holds that people 
should ignore sunk costs and that resources should be used for their most 
profitable purposes.  The upshot is supposed to be that entitlements in the 
law will have little effect on the ultimate allocation of resources, at least 
where transaction costs are low.  The empirical evidence shows, 
however, that past expenditures do influence behavior and that people 
aren’t willing to part with resources, even at a price they wouldn’t be 
willing to pay to obtain the resource in the first place.41  The successes of 
the standard theory turn out to be the special cases—it is only in contexts 
where professionals engage in repeated trades, and arbitrage is possible, 
that incentive structures minimize the influence of human boundedness.42 
C. Law and Economics Responds to the Challenges 
Some of the challenges to the law and economics movement can be 
successfully rebutted.  For example, as a formalization of common sense, 
standard economic theory has resources for rebutting “sniff test” charges.  
It doesn’t, for example, ignore compulsions or social norms and roles.  
Rather, it adopts the common-sense view that such factors influence 
what an agent wants, and so her preferences.  While notions like utility 
are admittedly foreign to common sense, it doesn’t follow that they are 
inconsistent with it.  Utility is just a mathematical representation of 
preferences, and so it ultimately reflects a person’s desires.  People can 
want all sorts of things, including states of affairs that appeal to their 
conceptions of fairness or justice.43  So, as Richard Posner notes, 
economic theory has no trouble accommodating “bounded self-interest” 
of the sort that describes people’s propensity to look beyond their own 
narrowly defined interests and act in ways that appear to promote 
fairness.44  In fact, it is pretty absurd to think of the human capacity to 
have interests that aren’t self-centered as a bound in the first place.  Only 
                                                     
 40. The Framing Theory of litigation holds that litigants treat their current asset positions as 
their reference points for evaluating gains and losses.  Plaintiffs, as potential gainers are modeled as 
risk averse; defendants, as potential losers, are modeled as risk loving.  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, 
Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996).  See generally Chris 
Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000) 
(arguing that the Framing Theory of litigation may lead to plaintiff-friendly settlements). This 
account might underestimate the barriers to settlement since a plaintiff may frame her decision from 
the standpoint prior to (perceived) injury. 
 41. Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1482–85, 1497. 
 42. Id. at 1485–86. 
 43. Ethical rules that serve as “side-constraints” on behavior (e.g., Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative) are not ipso facto irrational. 
 44. Posner, supra note 10, at 1553–55, 1557–58. 
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someone trapped in the mindset of ethical hedonism could count the 
existence of plural values as a limit. 
With respect to the formal apparatus of rational choice accounts, it is 
clear that people (even most economists) don’t consciously maximize 
subjective expected utility.  It does not follow, however, that standard 
economic theory is a failure, for introspective access is not a necessary 
component of a behavioral theory.45  Most of us, for example, can make 
pretty fine discriminations among smells, but we don’t have even the 
faintest idea how we do it.  A hypothesis naturally suggested by this sort 
of reflection is that economic models are like perceptual models in that 
both are abstract (even partial) characterizations of mental processes.46  
This sort of account treats subjective preferences and probabilities as 
important inputs to action, even when they aren’t the sole motivating 
forces. 
Economists, though, generally avoid this sort of account.  They 
prefer, instead, to take an instrumentalist line: what matters is predictive 
success rather than accurately describing behavioral mechanisms.  
Instrumentalism about economic theory is a response, in part, to “sniff 
test” objections.  “People aren’t like that” isn’t a relevant complaint 
against a predictive tool.  It is also motivated, however, by a desire to 
steer clear of psychological claims.47  In fact, given that much of the 
problematic data stems from relatively small-scale psychological studies, 
they would rather steer clear of individual-level claims about behavior 
altogether.  The instrumentalist position holds that economic models get 
human behavior right in the aggregate, regardless of what actually 
motivates the behavior.48  Even if most individuals fail to maximize 
subjective expected utility, instrumental economics should correctly 
predict aggregate behavior where deviations from maximization are 
random.  The standard line in economics is that it can tell you about the 
net effect of incentives on groups of people.49 
                                                     
 45. If it were, behavioral economics would also fail—most people don’t introspect their 
bounded rationality or bounded willpower. 
 46. E.g., POSNER, supra note 22, at 356; Stephen Ellis, What Economists (and Everyone Else) 
Should Think About Utility Theory, 18 S.W. PHIL. REV. 93, 99–100 (2002). 
 47. This desire is motivated, in part, by theoretical scruples about unobservable entities.  
ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 79–81 (Norman Daniels & Keith Lehrer 
eds., 1995). 
 48. KREPS, supra note 27, at 4. 
 49. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing the successes of economics’ “predictive 
power”); Posner, supra note 10, at 1556–57 (stating that economists ask questions relating to 
aggregate choices and not individual choices).  The locus classicus of this view is supposed to be 
Milton Friedman’s 1953 paper, The Methodology of Positive Economics, reprinted in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 210 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 1990).  Friedman does appear to endorse 
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An instrumentalist theory is a tool that takes information about 
certain accessible variables as an input and outputs a prediction, usually 
about the future state of those same variables.  Taken straight, economic 
models involve the mental states of particular individuals.  In order to 
use them as predictive tools, one must first specify the relevant 
accessible inputs.  Instrumentalism rides on the coattails of the normative 
economic theory here.  Economists usually treat the objective 
probabilities of a situation—what beliefs are directed at—as the 
subjective probabilities of relevant agents, and actual choices—what 
desires are supposed to order—as “revealed” preferences.50 
Interpreting economic models instrumentally also puts a lot of 
pressure on their predictive adequacy.  A noninstrumental model might 
plausibly claim to represent certain features of a situation even if those 
features are being overwhelmed in that circumstance.  Feathers and 
bowling balls don’t fall at the same rate in most actual circumstances, but 
it doesn’t follow that simple models of gravitational attraction are false.  
Likewise, perhaps, the actions of very tired or very hurried agents may 
not conform to the predictions of consumer theory.  An instrumental 
model of aggregate behavior that has empirical problems has no such 
intuitive plausibility to fall back on.  And, on balance, the empirical 
                                                                                                                       
a purely instrumentalist account: “The ultimate goal . . . is the development of a ‘theory’ or 
‘hypothesis’ that yields valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet 
observed.”  Id. at 213.  A closer reading, however, suggests a more nuanced view.  His basic point is 
that a good economic theory “abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex 
and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions 
on the basis of them alone.”  Id. at 218.  Thus, Friedman’s main point is that the empirical evidence 
(as opposed to intuitive judgment) determines which abstractions from the actual mechanisms are 
appropriate, not that any attention to mechanisms is irrelevant.  “Complete ‘realism’ is clearly 
unattainable, and the question whether a theory is realistic ‘enough’ can be settled only by seeing 
whether it yields predictions that are good enough for the purpose in hand . . . .”  Id. at 237; id. at 
221. 
 50. Interpreting economic theory instrumentally insulates it, to some extent, from counter-
evidence.  The failure of particular individuals to maximize subjective expected utility is not 
important if the theory doesn’t say anything about the behavior of individuals, much less their 
psychological mechanisms.  Even systematic failures can be chalked up to adverse selection of the 
sample studied from the larger population.  If behavior in a certain population is distributed around a 
mean of rational action, it will be possible to select more and less rational subsets of agents.  See 
Posner, supra note 10, at 1561, 1570–71 (stating selection of individuals for an experiment can 
change how results relate to a real-world environment). 
Despite the fact that it is rarely mentioned, the insulation from counter-evidence provided by 
standard economic instrumentalism clearly comes at a price.  Where there is adverse selection, 
economic models are likely to make bad predictions because a (sub)set of irrational agents won’t act 
in the way they suggest.  Posner, to his credit, admits that this is a problem for rational-choice 
accounts of criminal behavior: “If the [criminal justice] system is designed to deter, then criminals—
the part of the population that is not deterred—will not be a random draw from the population, just 
as lunatics are not a random draw.  We can expect the undeterrable to have peculiar traits, including, 
in a system in which punishment takes the form of imprisonment, an abnormal indifference to future 
consequences.”  Id. at 1568. 
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evidence suggests that economic theory is not up to the predictive task it 
is assigned.  It doesn’t, at least so far, account for much of the 
phenomena of interest to economists, orthodox or behavioral.  
Regardless of whether some standard model could account for the 
behavioral evidence, currently available models don’t.  As a tool, then, 
standard economic theory fails to predict as much of the relevant 
phenomena as we would like. 
The problems encountered by standard economic theory should 
come as no surprise.  It is, after all, based on common-sense intuitions, 
and common sense can lead us astray.  “Folk” accounts are often 
flawed—“folk physics,” for example, has heavier objects falling faster 
than lighter objects.  Even if the core “folk” account is on track, there is 
usually much more to be said (e.g., a good physical theory still must 
account for the difference between feathers and bowling balls).  
Everyone who thinks seriously about economic issues recognizes the 
need to adapt economic models to handle anomalous behavior. 
Orthodox economics tries to preserve the basic structure of 
subjective expected utility maximization and account for recalcitrant 
behavior by either finding new inputs into the old models that account 
for the empirical results (e.g., new motives, more complex beliefs about 
circumstances) or applying the old models in novel ways (e.g., “multiple 
person” models, evolutionary psychology).  The first strategy does 
successfully fend off certain challenges.  Some apparent difficulties are 
resolved by paying more attention to the objects of preference.  It isn’t 
anomalous for someone to drink Folgers most of the time, even when she 
claims to prefer Starbucks.  We recognize that Folgers-flavor vs. 
Starbucks-flavor isn’t the only relevant dimension to her choice: a cup of 
Folgers costs $0.75, while Starbucks runs $2 per cup.  Likewise, there is 
no anomaly if someone who usually buys a cheap candy bar on the way 
to the movies pays the inflated theater price when she is on a date.  
Paying full price can send a signal about her attitude toward money that 
she wants to send.51  In each of the foregoing cases, the inaccurate 
                                                     
 51. The candy bar case is due to an example by David Friedman: 
[C]onsider someone who has a choice between two identical products at 
different prices.  It seems that for almost any objective we can think of, he 
would prefer to buy the less expensive item.  . . . But suppose you are taking a 
date to a movie.  You know you are going to want a candy bar, which costs 
$1.00 in the theater and $0.50 in the Seven-Eleven grocery [store] you pass on 
your way there.  Do you stop at the store and buy a candy bar? 
DAVID FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE TEXT 3 (1990).  Friedman thinks that the only 
conclusion licensed by economic theory is yes.  He recognizes, of course, that you might not: “Do 
you want your date to think you are a tightwad?  You buy the candy bar at the theater, impressing 
your date (you hope) with the fact that you are the sort of person who does not have to worry about 
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prediction is the result of an insensitive modeler missing some feature of 
the situation to which the agent is responding.  Most attempts to 
safeguard economic theory from empirical counter-evidence follow this 
strategy.  They point to some extra structure in the difficult cases—such 
as sophisticated preferences or beliefs, information asymmetry, 
signaling, or strategic behavior—that changes the application of standard 
economic tools.52 
Still, the “new inputs” strategy has some important limits.  Initially, 
the extra attention to (beliefs about) circumstances, motives, and the like 
doesn’t make much sense unless they are thought of as real features of 
situations.  A plausible instrumentalist model must appeal to accessible 
inputs.  Appeal to beliefs or motives that aren’t apparent in the 
circumstances would be completely ad hoc.53  Further, it (usually) takes 
an agent who is actually rational to signal or otherwise engage in 
strategic behavior.  This sort of realism stands in direct opposition to the 
instrumentalist interpretation of models adopted by most economists.  
The standard focus on aggregate behavior in economics is also an 
uncomfortable fit with the “new inputs” strategy.  Only individually 
rational agents can perform most strategic behavior.  A set of agents who 
are merely rational on average probably can’t support sophisticated 
strategic applications of standard economic theory. 
Finally, the “new inputs” approach just doesn’t handle some of the 
important cases.  The empirical evidence does provide some decisive 
objections to economic theory.  There are some fairly simple cases where 
economic models fail despite the lack of any complicating environmental 
structures.  Appeal to hidden complexity in the world is no help with the 
Asian Disease case, for example.  The outcomes of programs A and C 
are literally identical, as are the outcomes of programs B and D—only 
                                                                                                                       
money.”  Id.  Standard economic theory, he thinks, just fails in this instance.  Does this case really 
tell against economic theory?  Obviously not, for the reasons outlined above.  Ellis, supra note 46, at 
97–98. 
There is a plausible response to the Allais paradox that runs along these lines.  The most popular 
choices are supposed to be inconsistent because an agent chooses B in Problem 1 if and only if u($0) 
< 34u($2400) - 33u($2500) and C in Problem 2 if and only if u($0) > 34u($2400) - 33u($2500).  Id. 
at 98.  For many, however, the $0 outcome in Problem 1 is accompanied by regret—“Oh God, I just 
blew a sure $2400”—in a way that the $0 outcome in Problem 2 is not.  Id.  There is nothing 
inconsistent about choosing B and C if u($0 & regret) < 34u($2400) - 33u($2500) and if u($0 & no 
regret) > 34u($2400) - 33u($2500).  Id. 
 52. Again, there are costs to this approach.  Complicating the application of economic theory 
means that one must abandon some of its straight-forward recommendations.  For example, the 
Coase theorem depends on the existence of a certain sort of simple market, one without strategic 
behavior.  E.g., Deirdre McCloskey, Other Things Equal: The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 E. 
ECON. J. 367, 367 (1998). 
 53. This fact accounts for David Friedman’s reluctance to distinguish between a candy bar on a 
date and a candy bar alone. 
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the terms used to describe them differ.  There are no asymmetries in the 
case for a modeler to miss.  Rather, agents seem to irrationally 
distinguish cases that aren’t actually different.  There isn’t any room for 
this in standard economic theory.54  This sort of failure also lends 
credence to the view that (yet-to-be-discovered) situational complexity 
might not be the best explanation for the more complicated apparent 
failures of economic theory.  If there is clear evidence that people 
systematically treat gains and losses differently in this case, then appeal 
to this sort of differential treatment is plausible in the disposition-effect 
cases and the lack-of-bargaining-around-judgments cases. 
The second strategy—applying the old models in novel ways—is 
woefully underdeveloped.  “Multiple selves” accounts haven’t been 
studied in any serious way.55  Even a cursory examination, however, 
raises some serious issues about the basic account of preferences at the 
heart of economic theory.  The main problem is understanding the 
relations among the different “selves.”  If we take the metaphor 
seriously, intrapersonal dynamics are at least as complicated as 
interpersonal dynamics.  It has been argued, for example, that there are 
intrapersonal versions of the prisoner’s dilemma and Arrow’s theorem.56  
Shifting to a “multiple selves” view would require seriously rethinking a 
host of issues.57  At any rate, the standard prescriptions of law and 
economics presuppose univocal agents.  The claim that legal rules 
maximize allocative efficiency, for example, takes for granted that the 
agents before the bar are the same agents whose behavior led to the court 
case in the first place. 
Appeal to evolutionary psychology amounts to a surrender to 
behavioral economics.  While evolutionary theory does use mathematical 
models that are quite similar to economic models, the “agent” in those 
models is nature, not the creatures that evolve.58  Nature “chooses” 
creatures that maximize her goal of inclusive fitness.  It doesn’t follow 
that those creatures are maximizers at all (think of insects), much less 
maximizers that share nature’s goal of inclusive fitness.  Evolutionary 
psychology suggests, rather, that people will be well adapted to their 
ancestral environments, not universal problem solvers.  In fact, relatively 
                                                     
 54. For more cases where economic theory clearly fails, see Part III, below. 
 55. Such accounts have, however, been put forth as a method of explaining such phenomena as 
hyperbolic discounting.  E.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 19. 
 56. Gregory S. Kavka, Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?, 7 ECON. 
& PHIL. 143, 148–53, 157–60 (1991). 
 57. For an overview of these issues, see generally Ellis, supra note 14. 
 58. Creatures are nature’s strategies on these accounts. 
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narrow behavioral rules are likely to provide lower-cost solutions to 
ecological challenges, at least where there is some environmental 
stability.  Prominent advocates of evolutionary psychology tell us that 
human behavior is driven by a grab-bag of ecologically rational 
heuristics rather than an all-purpose process of utility maximization.59  At 
a minimum, we should expect evolved beings to care about a variety of 
things other than inclusive fitness.60  All of this assumes that 
evolutionary psychology, as it is currently understood, is an accurate 
account, which is far from established.  There is little doubt that mental 
activity is underwritten in crucial ways by brains, and further, that brains, 
as bodily organs, are subject to evolutionary pressures.  It isn’t at all 
clear, however, exactly how brains underwrite minds.  Likewise, we 
don’t know very much about the crucial details of human ancestral 
environments.  As a result, we just don’t have any good idea about how 
selection pressures have influenced human thought.  Most of the 
accounts offered by evolutionary psychologists have some plausibility, 
but none has really established itself as likely.61 
The upshot is that things don’t look good for standard economic 
approaches.  While they have their virtues, they also confront a number 
of cases that they can’t explain, and they don’t seem to have the 
resources needed to expand their explanatory reach.  But all may not be 
lost: perhaps solutions to the difficult cases can be found in behavioral 
economics. 
III. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
A. The Rise of Behavioral Law and Economics 
Behavioral economics is explicitly an attempt to overcome the 
deficiencies of standard economics.  This approach accepts the normative 
appeal of economic theory—people should maximize their subjective 
expected utility.  It recognizes, however, that there are empirical 
                                                     
 59. Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox, in 
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 3, 5 (1999). 
 60. E.g., ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 2–3 (1988); Leda Cosmides & John 
Toobey, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND 163, 167 (Gerome H. 
Barkow et al. eds., 1992). 
 61. See, e.g., Jerry Fodor, The Trouble with Psychological Darwinism, 20 LONDON REV. OF 
BOOKS, Jan. 22, 1998, at 11, 13 (“[T]he direct evidence for psychological Darwinism is very slim 
indeed.”); Jerry Fodor, The Selfish Gene Pool: Mother Nature, Easter Bunnies and Other Common 
Mistakes, TIMES LITERARY SUPP., July 29, 2005, at 3, 5 (book review) (“The track record of such 
theories has not been good; in retrospect they often look foolish or vulgar or both.”). 
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difficulties with economic models, and posits that those problems are not 
the result of random noise, but follow from behavioral regularities.  
Behavioral economics modifies the structure of economic theory in order 
to capture those regularities and come up with adequate descriptive 
models.62  While the data about anomalous behavior receives most of the 
attention in the behavioral law and economics literature,63 behavioral 
economists themselves develop structural models that are meant to 
capture this data.  These models retain the basic structure of economic 
theory while replacing simple accounts of subjective probabilities and 
utilities with more psychologically plausible (but still mathematically 
tractable) alternatives. 
In its current state, behavioral economics appears scattered.  A 
glance at one of the basic articles or defining collections of essays 
reveals a grab bag of empirical findings that have little relationship with 
each other (though they all stand in opposition to some tenet of 
traditional economics).  Each new empirical falsification of an economic 
assumption gives rise to a new behavioral model, or at least a new 
modification of standard economic models.  There are some efforts to 
impose order on these investigations.  For example, Prospect Theory 
unites, in one model, changes that attempt to account for the disparate 
phenomena of endowment effects and overemphasis on low probability 
                                                     
 62. That behavioral economics is after better descriptive adequacy is clear in virtually every 
article on the topic.  It is equally clear that behavioral economists accept the normative appeal of 
standard accounts.  By treating anomalous actions as errors, they are buying into the norm of 
standard economics.  Behavioral economics began when “cognitive psychologists . . . took 
maximization of utilities and logical rules of probability judgment as benchmarks and used 
conformity or deviation from these benchmarks as a way to theorize about cognitive mechanisms 
(much as optical illusions are used to understand perception).”  Colin Camerer, Behavioral 
Economics: Reunifying Psychology and Economics, 96 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 10,575, 
10,575 (1999); see also Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1473–74, 1487, 1523–45 (discussing the history 
and objective of behavioral law and economics, along with factors that could improve the 
conventional law and economics theory); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263–65 (1979) (discussing the 
inadequacy of utility theory and proposing Prospect Theory as an alternative); A. Peter McGraw et 
al., The Limits of Fungibility: Relational Schemata and the Value of Things, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 
219, 219–21 (2003) (introducing a social-relational model to the endowment and mental accounting 
effects seen in consumer behavior); Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality 
Debate, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 94, 94 (2002) (discussing the “breakpoints” illustrated by the experiments 
of Kahneman and Tversky); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 458 (1981) (applying psychological principles to the Asian 
Disease case).  Behavioral economists sometimes claim that “dysfunctional effects within one 
framework will often look functional in another.”  Tetlock & Mellers, supra, at 98.  This, however, 
hardly amounts to throwing off the norms of standard economic theory (which after all are a subset 
of the norms of common sense).  Given their views about human capacities, it isn’t surprising that 
behavioral economists offer different prescriptions than orthodox economists.  Both sets of 
prescriptions, however, are aimed at the same ideal—actions that optimally satisfy desires. 
 63. Posner, supra note 10, at 1558–61. 
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events.  And, somewhat less persuasively, the behavioral phenomena to 
be explained are grouped together in categories such as bounded 
rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.64  But on 
balance, behavioral economics comes across as a collection of insights 
into what appear to be almost wholly distinct psychological phenomena. 
Prospect Theory merits close attention since it is the most well-
developed behavioral model.  Amos Kahneman and Daniel Tversky 
explicitly formulated it as an empirically superior alternative to 
Subjective Expected Utility Maximization.65  They were impressed, in 
particular, by the evidence of endowment effects and description-
dependent preferences.  In order to account for this evidence, Prospect 
Theory replaces the utility assignments of standard theory (to total asset 
positions, or, more generally, total states of affairs) with a value function 
that assesses changes (in total assets, or, more generally, situations) from 
a reference point.66  People, on this account, evaluate changes in their 
circumstances rather than the circumstances themselves.  In order to 
capture the empirical data, Prospect Theory directly models people as 
risk averse for gains and risk loving for losses.67  The following figure 
represents the sort of value function that results.68 
 
                                                     
 64. Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1476–79. 
 65. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 62, at 263. 
 66. Id. at 277. 
 67. Id. at 279. 
 68. Id. 
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Note that a material (and so value) gain can reset the reference point.  
From the new reference point, an equivalent material loss will result in 
an even greater value loss.  In order to model reference-point-based 
values, Prospect Theory must account for how reference points are set.  
To do this, it adds a framing step to the decision process.69  A person’s 
reference point is usually her current asset position, but framing allows 
that her reference point can differ depending on her expectations and 
how her circumstances are presented to her.70  In the Asian Disease case, 
for example, the problems are phrased in a way that permits multiple 
reference points (“the outbreak . . . is expected to kill 600 people”).71  
The programs, however, imply specific reference points: programs A 
and B save lives, suggesting that we should think of the 600 as already 
gone; programs C and D limit loss of life, suggesting that we should think 
of the 600 as still with us.72 
Kahneman and Tversky also see evidence that people overweight 
low probability events in their decisions,73 so they replace the subjective 
probabilities of standard theory with decision weights that capture this 
effect.74 
                                                     
 69. Id. at 286–88. 
 70. Id. at 286. 
 71. For a discussion of the Asian Disease case, see supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 72. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 73. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 62, at 281. 
 74. Id. at 282–83. 
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For any probability p < 0.3 (or so), the decision weight π(p) > p; for 
probability p > 0.3 (or so), the decision weight π(p) < p.75 
While Prospect Theory is the most developed behavioral account, it 
isn’t the whole story.  It does, however, serve as a jumping-off point for 
most advances in behavioral economics.76  Mental accounting, an 
                                                     
 75. Camerer, supra note 36, at 288; Drazen Prelec, The Probability Weighting Function, 66 
ECONOMETRICA 497, 497 (1998). 
 76. Cumulative Prospect Theory, for example, proposes an alternative account of (still 
nonlinear) decision weights.  In the original Prospect Theory, the decision weights are transformed 
simple probabilities.  If, for example, P(x) = 0.5, then the decision weight for x is π(0.5).  The 
cumulative probability of x will be P(outcome ≤ x); the relevant decision weight for x will be 
w(P(outcome ≤ x)).  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 299–301 (1992).  This change in 
focus is supposed to have some advantages, but it doesn’t make much difference in the predictions 
of models once the relevant weighting functions have been calibrated with the empirical data.  
William Neilson & Jill Stowe, A Further Examination of Cumulative Prospect Theory 
Parameterizations, 24 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 31, 44 (2002).  The shift from Prospect Theory to 
Cumulative Prospect Theory was motivated, oddly enough, by theoretical considerations rather than 
empirical evidence.  Prospect Theory allows for violations of first order stochastic dominance; 
Cumulative Prospect Theory doesn’t.  The shift was motivated primarily by this difference, on the 
grounds that violations of stochastic dominance are just too outrageous.  E.g., Alain Chateauneuf & 
Peter Wakker, An Axiomatization of Cumulative Prospect Theory for Decision Under Risk, 18 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 137, 137 (1999); Ulrich Schmidt, Reference Dependence in Cumulative 
Prospect Theory, 47 J. MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOL. 122, 122 (2003); Tversky & Kahneman, supra, at 
298, 299–300, 302.  There is evidence, however, that people often choose gambles that are 
stochastically dominated.  E.g., Michael Birnbaum & Juan Navarrete, Testing Descriptive Utility 
Theories: Violations of Stochastic Dominance and Cumulative Independence, 17 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 49, 49 (1998).  A drawback of cumulative decision weights is that they are only well 
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approach pioneered by Richard Thaler, is probably the most important 
extension.  Starting from the insight that people evaluate gains and losses 
asymmetrically, Thaler notes that the prospects being evaluated are not 
always well defined.  Suppose, for example, that someone goes shopping 
and gets one item at a deep discount (a gain relative to her reference 
point) but ends up paying more than expected for another item (a loss 
relative to her reference point).  Does she evaluate each item-transaction 
separately and then aggregate those values or does she aggregate the 
item-transactions and then evaluate?  In Prospect Theory, the sum of the 
values of two objects is not generally the same as the value of those two 
objects together (i.e., v(x) + v(y) ≠ v(x&y)) so whether someone thinks of 
the objects as distinct prospects or parts of the same prospect will matter 
in how she evaluates them. 77 
The details of Mental Accounting are not crucial for our purposes.  
Suffice it to say that people organize “expenditures” and “credits” by 
type (e.g., money vs. time), topic (e.g., entertainment vs. cash reserves), 
and time-frame (e.g., gambling proceeds for the day vs. those for the 
trip).  Where the categorization isn’t fixed, people seem to organize 
prospects for evaluation in such a way as to maximize the aggregate 
amount of value experienced.  According to Mental Accounting, then, 
the framing step of a decision process slices up the space of outcomes to 
be evaluated as well as sets up reference points for gains and losses.78 
Prospect Theory and its elaborations must be understood as 
nonaggregative, noninstrumentalist accounts.  The relatively small-scale 
experiments (at least compared with markets) that provide the data for 
Prospect Theory are meant to isolate behavior at an individual level.  
Kahneman and Tversky see this behavior as evidence of real 
psychological structure.79  Indeed, it would be difficult to even develop a 
                                                                                                                       
defined where it makes sense to order outcomes as greater than, less than, or equal to one another.  
This requirement may turn out to be problematic, e.g., cumulative decision weights won’t be defined 
over partial preference orderings. 
 77. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183, 183–
86 (1999) [hereinafter Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters]; Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting 
and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199, 199–201 (1985) [hereinafter Thaler, Consumer 
Choice]. 
 78. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, supra note 77, at 186–203; Thaler, Consumer Choice, 
supra note 77, at 201–14.  See generally Nicolao Bonini & Rino Rumiati, Acceptance of a Price 
Discount: The Role of Semantic Relatedness Between Purchases and the Comparative Price Format, 
15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 203 (2002) (discussing price reductions and mental accounting in 
consumer decisions); Todd L. Cherry, Mental Accounting and Other-Regarding Behavior: Evidence 
from the Lab, 22 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 605 (2001) (examining the role of unearned money in other-
regarding behavior in the dictator game); McGraw et al., supra note 62, at 219 (discussing consumer 
decisions and mental accounting). 
 79. Camerer, supra note 62, at 10,575, 10,577; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 62, at 457;. 
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convincing instrumentalist interpretation of Prospect Theory.  Orthodox 
economics can plausibly be an instrumentalist account because it can 
treat environmental frequencies as subjective probabilities and actual 
choices as “revealed” preferences.  According to Prospect Theory, 
however, there is a gap between normative concepts like preferences and 
beliefs on the one hand and descriptive concepts like value functions and 
decision weights on the other.  Given this distance, there don’t seem to 
be any intuitive features of cases themselves that can effectively serve as 
proxies for the apparatus of Prospect Theory.  This seems to generalize 
to any account that significantly diverges from orthodox economics.  
Something at the individual level must actually correspond to value 
functions, decision weights, etc. in order for behavioral accounts to make 
sense. 
Behavioral economics is a fundamentally conservative approach in 
that it retains the basic approaches and structures of economic theory.  Its 
basic project is that of standard economics, with extra concern for 
empirical adequacy.  Like orthodox accounts, behavioral models attempt 
to formalize the common-sense notions of desire and belief.  The value 
functions of Prospect Theory, for example, attempt to capture the role 
normally assigned to desire just as utility functions of standard theory try 
to.  Likewise, the decision weights of Prospect Theory try to regiment the 
role of beliefs in much the way that the subjective probabilities of 
standard theory attempt to.  The only serious difference is that the 
functional forms of Prospect Theory formalizations are explicitly 
developed with an eye toward the empirical data. 
Some of these modifications proposed by behavioral theories, 
however, require additions to the basic structure provided by common 
sense.  Since it requires a reference point in order to categorize the gains 
and losses that are assessed by the value function, Prospect Theory 
supplies a framing account of how reference points are set.  Mental 
accounting requires a framing step to account for how the space of 
outcomes is partitioned.  While framing is not part of the core principle 
of folk psychology formalized by standard economics, it isn’t foreign to 
common sense.  People sometimes see the glass as half empty, 
sometimes as half full.80  Still, Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, and the 
others don’t import much that is new.  Once the reference points are in 
place and the objects of evaluation are discriminated, they tend to focus 
on exactly the determinants of behavior that standard economists do—
what people value and believe. 
                                                     
 80. More on this below. 
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Because most behavioral models attempt to formalize what is worth 
preserving from the common-sense notions of desire and belief, we find 
evidence of behavioral economic effects already built into legal doctrine 
(just as we did with standard economic theory).  Take, for example, the 
endowment effect, one of the more robust empirical findings that 
influences behavioral economics.81  This effect describes the fact that 
people value items they already own more than they would pay to 
acquire the same items.  Such a discovery would appear to be a novel 
aspect of human behavior that should quickly suggest a variety of 
improvements in legal doctrine.  But while there have been some 
suggestions along these lines,82 there have not been nearly as many as 
one would have thought.  Part of the reason for this, as Sam Issacharoff 
noted, “is that in this area behavioral models have already been best 
integrated into the understanding of legal claims.”83  The same may be 
said of some of the other models of behavioral economics.  Indeed, the 
concept of “bounded self-interest”—the fact that people tend to care 
more about fairness than predicted by traditional economic models—may 
help explain those “anomalies” of law and economics where judges 
appear to be concerned with distributional concerns as well as allocative 
ones. 
B. Challenges to Behavioral Law and Economics 
Behavioral economics is better with respect to empirical adequacy 
than the orthodox theory, but even there it is something of a mixed bag.  
In the first place, it is unclear that behavioral accounts can cope with the 
successes of standard economic theory.  In the laboratory, experimental 
economists have shown that exchange markets set up with agents who 
know only their own circumstances converge to the prices and 
allocations predicted by standard general equilibrium analysis.84  These 
sorts of successes occur in the real world as well, as even advocates of 
behavioral economics admit.85  As we saw before, these advocates argue 
                                                     
 81. The endowment effect is a corollary of Prospect Theory’s loss aversion.  For a summary of 
the studies supporting the existence of the effect, see Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of 
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1327 tbl.1 (1990). 
 82. E.g., Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 83. Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1729, 1736 (1998). 
 84. E.g., KREPS, supra note 27, at 198; Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast 
Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J. POL. ECON. 877, 880 (1991). 
 85. See Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1486 (stating that “markets can sometimes lead to behavior 
consistent with conventional economic assumptions”). 
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that these successes of economic theory occur only in special 
circumstances.  This caveat, even if accurate, is no help, however, for 
behavioral models that just build the usual regularities into their core 
equations.  Even the discipline provided by high stakes and arbitrage 
opportunities is no help for an agent if her beliefs work like the decision 
weights of Prospect Theory.  Interaction among behavioral agents is 
unlikely to result in the same outcome as interaction among standard 
economic agents. 
Obviously, Prospect Theory and its kin capture the cases they are 
designed to capture.  There are, however, a number of ways to account 
for the empirical evidence in question.  Given this fact, one might 
question why behavioral economists make the exact modifications to the 
functional forms of standard theory that they do.  There is clearly an idea 
that as much of orthodox economics as possible is to be preserved, and 
that changes should be made only as new behavioral anomalies appear in 
the data.86  This approach seems to be a hangover from standard 
economic instrumentalism—if all that matters is predictive success then 
it makes sense to accommodate the evidence in a direct way, without 
worrying too much about the underlying psychology.  Note, however, 
that this sort of latent instrumentalism is quite implausible for behavioral 
accounts such as Prospect Theory.  Further, such a piecemeal, data-
driven approach is troubling because of the way changes in models can 
interact.  A modification to account for one sort of evidence might 
change the way in which other evidence can be accommodated. 
This sort of interference can be seen in the behavioral economic 
literature.  Appeal to reference-point-dependent value, for example, 
competes with appeal to fairness norms as the explanation for 
unexpected failures to bargain around court orders.87  No model could 
incorporate both Prospect-Theory-style value functions and a Sunstein-
style appeal to fairness norms: Sunstein holds that fairness norms have 
influence apart from mediation by preferences.88  A model with both 
value functions and norms mediated by preferences would have too 
much—one or the other is sufficient to account for the data.  
Projectability is also a concern: do behavioral accounts handle the new 
evidence as it comes in?  The empirical work seems mixed.  James 
Druckman, for example, finds that while reference-point framing effects 
                                                     
 86. See Christine Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1593, 1593 (1998) (providing Posner’s criticisms of behavioral economics). 
 87. Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1497–98. 
 88. Sunstein, supra note 38, at 139. 
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seem to occur in certain political contexts, they don’t occur in others.89  
The upshot is that behavioral anomalies like the framing effect are not 
constant, but, rather, are intermittent and dependent on circumstances.  
Without some underlying theory telling us when the various anomalies 
are likely to occur, it is difficult to piece behavioral economics into a 
coherent picture, much less one that can be readily integrated with the 
successes of standard economics. 
While those who work in law and behavioral economics readily 
admit the lack of a unifying theory, they do not view this as an 
insurmountable problem.90  The contrast drawn here, as always, is with 
traditional economics, which they see as well-theorized but empirically 
false (at least on many occasions).91  In choosing between a complete 
theory that leads to incorrect predictions and an incomplete group of 
psychological phenomena that, when applied in the right context, lead to 
accurate predictions, it’s easy to see the appeal of behavioral economics.  
Indeed, it is sometimes viewed as a version of legal pragmatism.92  And 
those in law and behavioral economics rightly caution that the discipline 
is still in its infancy, and express hope that someday it will come together 
into a more coherent theory.93  (That said, relatively little work is done to 
further this goal; instead, most of the work tends to involve the 
application of existing behavioral models to particular legal doctrines.) 
But the lack of a unified theory is a serious shortcoming, especially 
in the context of developing prescriptions for legal doctrine.  Initially, the 
lack of such a theory makes it difficult to sort out the relationships 
among the great (and growing) number of heuristics, biases, and other 
behavioral “anomalies.”  There may be multiple behavioral explanations 
for many types of behavior; indeed, as noted above, this sort of problem 
is already springing up in the literature.  Without some theory that 
explains the relationships among competing models, it seems less likely  
 
                                                     
 89. James N. Druckman, Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the 
(Ir)relevance of Framing Effects, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 671, 673–81 (2004) [hereinafter Druckman, 
Political Preference Formation]; see also James N. Druckman, Using Credible Advice to Overcome 
Framing Effects, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62, 63 (2001); Jerwen Jou et al., An Information Processing 
View of Framing Effects: The Role of Causal Schemas in Decision Making, 24 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 1, 8 (1996). 
 90. Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1487–89; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 39, at 1057–58, 1071–
73; Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1747, 1747 (1998). 
 91. Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1487–89; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 39, at 1057–58. 
 92. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 39, at 1057. 
 93. Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1487; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 39, at 1057; Ulen, supra 
note 90, at 1747. 
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that a particular behavioral approach will gain much traction among 
lawmakers. 
There is also a related problem: without a unified theory of behavior, 
it is difficult to figure out when lawmakers should apply traditional 
economics and when they should apply behavioral economics (or, if 
behavioral models are viewed as fine-tuning standard models, when you 
fine-tune and when you leave well enough alone).  Take, for example, 
the fact that people value items they already own more than they would 
pay to acquire the same items (i.e., the endowment effect).  Is it, as 
posited by behavioral economists, best modeled by Prospect Theory’s 
reference-point-dependent value functions?  Or is it, according to 
standard accounts, best explained by some combination of wealth effects, 
rational adaptation, and the absence of close substitutes?  Without a 
unified theory, we are not even sure that the two accounts compete at 
all—perhaps the behavior is best captured by some combination of the 
two. 
Integrating the findings of behavioral economics into a more unified 
theory of behavior would go a long way toward persuading both legal 
academics and, ultimately, policymakers of their importance.  A large 
part of Richard Posner’s critique of behavioral economics is that it is 
“undertheorized.”94  Other legal academics, though less wedded to 
traditional law and economics methods, make a similar point.95  
Policymakers, too, will be reluctant to jump on board without some 
principled way of mediating among behavioral models.  The law, after 
all, is a collection of fairly general rules of widespread applicability.  
While some tailoring is obviously possible, there are limits.  And, given 
                                                     
 94. Posner, supra note 10, at 1559. 
 95. See Issacharoff, supra note 83, at 1734.  Issacharoff, for example, believes that at least four 
conditions must be met in order for a successful behavioral law and economics to emerge: 
 1. The effects identified must be generalizable and not limited to idiosyncratic 
situation-specific departures from rational model expectations; 
 2. The effects identified must be robust; 
 3. The effects identified must be of sufficient magnitude as to systematically 
undermine  
  predictions of behavior derived from models that assume rational choice; 
 4. The insights derived from the behavioral and psychological studies must be 
capable of  
  being operationalized to condition the behavior of all persons subject to 
specific regulation. 
Id. at 1734.  It should come as no surprise that the legal academy would be much more eager to 
embrace the empirical results if they came as part of a broader theory of behavior—the academy has 
always been drawn to more scientific theories of the law (one needs only to think of Langdell’s 
formalism, the Progressive’s belief in the power of science, and Law and Economics; even the Legal 
Realists looked to the new work in psychology to buttress their claims). 
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the current state of behavioral economics, it may well be that most 
policymakers choose to stay with the status quo (the status quo bias at 
work!). 
C. The Root of the Problem 
The root of the problem may not be that behavioral economics is 
undertheorized.  It is, after all, as capable of forming models to handle 
cases as standard economics.  The problem, rather, is that behavioral 
models are undermotivated.  The fact that standard models don’t handle 
the empirical evidence is good reason to alter those models, but the 
alterations themselves are pretty simple-minded.  Behavioral economists 
often fail to draw a distinction between empirical evidence and what it is 
evidence for.  If, for example, the data suggest an endowment effect, the 
behavioral approach treats that effect as a brute fact, building it into the 
core apparatus of the model without any further ado.  This sort of “curve 
fitting” approach accepts without question that standard economic 
models are both normatively attractive and in the right neighborhood of 
the causal mechanisms of behavior.  This, in turn, suggests a certain 
diagnosis of the problems with standard economic theory: we know what 
people are supposed to do, but there are flaws in the design that 
implements the plan.96 
Behavioral economics, then, lets standard economic theory set the 
agenda: it discusses exactly the elements of common sense that standard 
theory discusses; it (mostly) leaves out what standard theory leaves out.  
Both the source and the failures of economic theory suggest, however, 
that this approach should at least be questioned.  Economic theory is 
abstracted from folk psychology.  If it has problems, it is at least a live 
possibility that the abstraction was deficient.  This point is more urgent 
when it becomes clear that behavioral economics is prey to similar 
failures. 
Like orthodox accounts, behavioral models hold that behavior 
reflects all of an agent’s wants, interests, values, etc.  The gains and 
losses that value functions in Prospect Theory assess are, for example, 
overall gains and losses concerning the prospect at hand.  There is, 
however, evidence of human “tunnel vision” that suggests people often 
act on a proper subset of the values they hold.  Some behavioral 
                                                     
 96. It is an interesting feature of this approach that although it accepts orthodox economics as a 
normative benchmark, it characterizes agents as incapable of making direct progress in 
approximating that norm.  An agent accurately characterized by Prospect Theory, for example, 
couldn’t evaluate overall circumstances, as opposed to changes in those circumstances. 
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phenomena are, therefore, beyond the reach of even behavioral 
economics. 
Consider, for example, an experience of George Orwell in the 
Spanish Civil War.97  Orwell had gone out to snipe at Fascists.98  He saw 
an easy target—a fleeing enemy soldier holding up his trousers as he 
ran—but he couldn’t shoot because “a man who is holding up his 
trousers isn’t a ‘Fascist’, he is visibly a fellow creature, similar to 
yourself, and you don’t feel like shooting at him.”99  Orwell knew, of 
course, that the man was still a Fascist, but he didn’t see him that way.  
He also realized that others he had fired at (both before and after the 
incident) were fellow creatures, but he did see them as Fascists, and he 
shot with resolve if not relish.100 
Something recognizable as framing seems to be going on here—
before Orwell decided whether to shoot, he focused in on certain aspects 
of his situation rather than others.  But this clearly isn’t framing as 
Prospect Theory understands it—there aren’t any reference point issues 
here.  Orwell seemed to hold two relevant principles: it is generally 
wrong to kill others and it is generally right to stop the spread of 
Fascism.  We expect someone who volunteers to serve in an armed 
conflict to come to an understanding about how such principles fit 
together.  Orwell, for example, (usually) seemed to think that stopping 
the spread of Fascism was crucial enough to allow some compromise on 
his principle against killing.  Standard economics presupposes these sorts 
of overall evaluations—an act of killing has a utility assignment, all 
(factual and motivational) things considered.  Behavioral economics 
follows the same line.  Whether some action counts as a net gain or loss 
is determined by the whole person’s motivational structure.  Mental 
accounting does nothing to change this since it only addresses what the 
basic objects of evaluation are, not how they get evaluated.  In the case at 
hand, however, Orwell seems to have lost contact with his usual overall 
evaluation.  He wasn’t able to understand (frame) his situation as one 
where he was shooting a Fascist; he had “tunnel-vision” on the humanity 
of his intended victim. 
Economists of all stripes are likely to write off Orwell’s case as a 
psychological anomaly, but this is a mistake.  Attention is at least as 
                                                     
 97. FREDERIC SCHICK, UNDERSTANDING ACTION 1–2 (1991). 
 98. George Orwell, Looking Back on the Spanish War, in 2 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, 
JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL: MY COUNTRY RIGHT OR LEFT 1940–1943, at 249, 
253 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 1968). 
 99. Id. at 254. 
 100. Ellis, supra note 46, at 100. 
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bounded as rationality or willpower.  On reflection, it should be obvious 
that people rarely reflect on all of their values or beliefs when they act.  
Steve, for example, doesn’t consider all of the implicated values when he 
goes to the snack machine at work (although he probably should).  
Rather, he feels a twinge of hunger that distracts him from the task at 
hand and he acts to satisfy that hunger with no real thought to the costs. 
There is a similar story of “tunnel-vision” at the very foundation of 
economics.  One of the stylized facts about markets is that they lead 
people to act on bottom line considerations, i.e., to get money, products, 
services, etc.  In the marketplace, people act for personal gain; other 
values are reflected only in what they do with those gains.  Both critics 
and advocates of markets generally agree that they lead people to focus 
on bottom-line issues, at least in certain contexts.  They disagree only 
about whether this is a good thing.101  Markets are thought to have this 
effect because of the way economic incentives work: acting on 
nonmarket values is costly; market competition drives out high-cost 
competitors. 
This story can’t be right, however, at least in many cases.  As we saw 
before, people care about a variety of issues, including many that aren’t 
self-focused.  According to economic theory, orthodox or behavioral, 
markets should reflect this fact.  If consumers really care about, say, 
labor rights or avoiding racial “inferiors,” they should be willing to pay 
to further those goals.  Entrepreneurs, then, should compete to satisfy the 
demand for products that advance these goals (e.g., labor-friendly shoes, 
Caucasian-produced bread).  Niche marketing of this sort exists, of 
course, but it is relatively rare.  While markets certainly haven’t 
eradicated racism, or any other nonpecuniary value, people do tend to 
focus on narrowly “economic” considerations when they do things like 
make purchases or hire workers.  The standard economic picture, one 
shared by both orthodox and behavioral accounts, has it that people act 
from their whole minds.  The common evidence of human tunnel vision 
strongly suggests that this picture is inadequate. 
                                                     
 101. This claim is an element in many criticisms of market-oriented societies.  Elizabeth 
Anderson claims, for example, that the freedom of the market is really freedom from (most) values.  
Elizabeth Anderson, The Ethical Limitations of the Market, 6 ECON. & PHIL. 197, 204 (1990).  It is 
more surprising, perhaps, that proponents of market systems make similar points.  The classic 
argument that free enterprise undermines racial discrimination holds, for instance, that markets lead 
employers to put profit before prejudice.  E.g., GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 
31 (1957); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108–09 (1982); Kenneth Arrow, The 
Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert 
Rees eds., 1973). 
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The upshot is that things don’t look much better for behavioral 
economic approaches than they do for standard approaches.  While they 
have their virtues, behavioral models also confront a number of cases 
that they can’t explain and they don’t seem to have the resources needed 
to expand their explanatory reach.  While both standard and behavioral 
economics formalize certain central aspects of common sense, there are 
other aspects that they leave out.  There are resources in those other 
aspects that can be exploited to handle some data.  Sometimes, for 
example, we explain behavior by holding that people are overwhelmed 
by emotion.  Likewise, we explain some behavior by holding that people 
are distracted from important information.  The difficulties encountered 
by both orthodox and behavioral economics suggest, at least, that it 
would pay to look again at the original regimentation of common sense 
to see if there is anything worthwhile that was left out.  Such a 
reexamination can provide insights for both normative and descriptive 
models of behavior. 
IV. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF BEHAVIOR FOR LAW 
When attempting to develop a more unified theory of behavior, it 
makes sense to begin by asking whether there are any features that are 
common to the great variety of behavioral anomalies.  One candidate is 
the importance of context.102  The phenomena catalogued by behavioral 
economists often turn on a change in the context of the action or decision 
at issue (or, to be more precise, they turn on a change in the subject’s 
apprehension of the situation).  The subjects of Prospect-Theory 
experiments, for example, respond differently to situations involving 
perceived gains and those involving perceived losses.  Indeed, the highly 
contextual nature of many of the behavioral effects is one of the things 
that makes them so difficult to pin down and, ultimately, operationalize 
into law.  Thus we are told by scholars of law and behavioral economics 
that, without an overarching theory, the key to developing useful legal 
commands in any given circumstance involves “due regard for the  
 
                                                     
 102. At first glance, looking to something as broad as the context of action appears to be too 
abstract to be of much use.  But here it is good to remember that we are attempting to unify what 
appear to be a rather wide-ranging group of behavioral phenomena.  It is unlikely that the unifying 
principle is going to take the form of some hidden trick of the mind that we’re completely 
unacquainted with; more likely, it will be something right under our noses.  Whether systematic 
attention to context ultimately gives rise to a theory that is too ad hoc or underdetermined, however, 
is a fair question, and one that is taken up later in this Part. 
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relevant decision-making capabilities of the actors in that specific 
setting.”103 
But it is not merely a change in context that gives rise to the cases 
that cause so much trouble for standard economic theory.  A new 
situation often presents a person with new information, and clearly that 
information can change the person’s underlying beliefs or ultimately 
even her desires.  Standard economics, however, can easily handle such 
changes.  What standard economics cannot do is accommodate changes 
in context that are unaccompanied by changes in underlying beliefs and 
desires and nonetheless prompt different actions.  Thus, our 
reexamination of common-sense psychology should be with an eye to 
finding a way to build the context of human action back into our 
motivational theory as an independent factor. 
A. The Understandings Approach 
The observation that actions take place in specific contexts is not 
new.  It has long been recognized that a person is disposed to act in a 
situation that poses a particular problem (challenge, opportunity, etc.), 
and that she responds to the problem by trying to solve it.104  Aristotle 
provides a simple example: “‘I have to drink,’ says appetite.  ‘Here’s 
drink,’ says sense-perception or phantasia or thought.  ‘At once he 
drinks.’”105  In this case, some situation prompts the agent’s thirst, such 
as heat or exercise.  A person can be thirsty, of course, without paying 
much attention to that fact.  Here, however, she does pay attention.  The 
agent’s view of her situation activates her desire for a drink.  Her 
perception of her circumstance brings thirst to the fore, making it seem 
like a problem.  The agent operates in the context of her problem.  She 
sees that she can do something about her thirst—take a drink—and so 
she does.  Note that Aristotle’s agent still has many other reasons—she 
wants to give a sacrifice, finish a tragedy, etc.—but in this situation she 
acts on her thirst.  Common sense tells us, then, that only a part of a 
person’s preference structure might be “on line” at any given time.   
 
                                                     
 103. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 39, at 1058 (emphasis added). 
 104. FREDERIC SCHICK, MAKING CHOICES: A RECASTING OF DECISION THEORY 17–18 (1997); 
SCHICK, supra note 97, at 55–60; GEORGE HENRIK VON WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASON 50–51 
(1983); Rex Martin, Intelligability, 74 MONIST 129, 129–30 (1991); Rex Martin, G.H. von Wright on 
Explanation and Understanding: An Appraisal, 29 HISTORY AND THEORY 205, 206–08 (1990) . 
 105. ARISTOTLE, DE MOTU ANIMALIUM 701a32–34 (Martha Craven Nussbaum trans., Princeton 
Univ. Press 1978). 
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People have a limited capacity for comprehending their environments.  
As a result, their attention is selective.106 
Frederic Schick, in a series of articles and books over the last two 
decades, has developed an addition to the standard folk psychological 
account of action that captures the role of perceived circumstances in 
causing actions.107  He calls desire-belief pairs grounds.108  Grounds are 
potential reasons for actions.  Each of us has grounds for a number of 
incompatible actions.  A particular ground is activated, and so leads to 
action, in virtue of the person’s understanding of her situation.109  In 
Aristotle’s case, the agent’s ground for drinking (and not her other 
grounds) is activated by her understanding that thirst is her problem now, 
not her religious duties or her play deadline.  She acts to satisfy only that 
desire.  A person has one understanding at a time—the one implicit in the 
mental states she is actually using.  This understanding cannot always be 
simply characterized, of course.  It might involve more than one 
dominant theme, e.g., someone might understand a situation in terms of 
both loyalty and justice.  Compound understandings of this sort involve 
as elements considerations that might constitute separate understandings 
on their own.  A complex understanding activates a particular ground 
only when the agent sees as her objective the object of the desire 
component of the ground.110 
Thinking about understandings helps us see that reasons aren’t 
necessarily overall evaluations of the sort that utility or value functions 
are supposed to provide in standard economic or Prospect Theory, 
respectively.  There are often interests (contained in unactivated grounds) 
that aren’t considered.  How is partial evaluation sufficient to support an 
action?  An activated ground shows that a course of action is desirable 
insofar as it advances toward the objective the agent actually considers.  
Given her understanding, she doesn’t see anything to give her pause 
before acting.  This insight leads Schick to develop a three-part theory of 
reasons.  If a person has grounds for an action and she understands her 
circumstances in a way that activates exactly the mental states that make 
                                                     
 106. Different people can understand the same circumstances in different ways.  Particular 
people are not necessarily tied to particular perspectives, however. 
 107. FREDERIC SCHICK, AMBIGUITY AND LOGIC 60–61 (2003); SCHICK, supra note 97; SCHICK, 
supra note 104, at 18; Frederic Schick, Status Quo Basing and the Logic of Value, 15 ECON. & PHIL. 
23 (1999); Frederic Schick, Allowing for Understandings, 89 J. PHIL. 30 (1992); Frederic Schick, 
Coping With Conflict, 85 J. PHIL. 362 (1988); Frederic Schick, Rationality: A Third Dimension, 3 
ECON. & PHIL. 49 (1987). 
 108. SCHICK, supra note 104, at 14–15, 22. 
 109. Id. at 15–23. 
 110. Id. at 23–27, 67–71; SCHICK, supra note 97, at 61–65. 
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up those grounds, then she does the action.  Schematically, if a person (1) 
wants A; (2) believes both that A only if B and B is available; and (3) 
understands her situation as one where (a) the realization of A is her 
objective, i.e., the desire for A is the only one activated; (b) making B 
true is a means to or way of making A true, i.e., the belief that A only if B 
is activated; and (c) some option realizes B, i.e., the belief that B is 
available is activated, then she does B.  If someone has a ground for an 
action and she uses exactly the mental states that make up that ground to 
think about her situation, then the action suggested by that ground will 
(in the absence of external restraint or infirmity) ensue—no other 
considerations that could derail the transition from desire to action are 
active.111 
It is hard to say what makes some features salient and others not in a 
given situation.  Of course, we don’t need to know the full story for the 
purposes of this paper—we’re suggesting a line of inquiry, not a finished 
account.  Folk psychology tells us enough, however, to convince us that 
this line is worth pursuing.  The understandings account is essentially an 
associationist story.  To have a certain understanding is to represent a 
situation with certain propositions involving certain properties.  Attitudes 
toward those propositions are thereby activated and so employed in 
reasoning.  Other propositions involving those properties are likely to 
spring to mind as well, activating desires and beliefs that involve them.  
We might believe of someone, for example, that he sees her action as a 
threat to his masculinity.  The person in question sees the circumstances 
surrounding her action and his response through the lens of his 
masculinity: that consideration looms large in his thinking.  His beliefs 
about manliness, his desire to protect his own manliness, considerations 
involving the relationship between masculinity and other aspects of his 
self-image, etc., come to mind when he thinks about his situation and so 
they will guide his actions.  These are the sorts of “principles of 
connexion among ideas” to which David Hume refers.112 
                                                     
 111. SCHICK, supra note 97, at 84–88.  Note that on this view, instrumental rationality can be 
subjectivist about understandings as well as beliefs and desires.  Still, there are normative issues 
about what constitutes appropriate understandings, just as there are normative issues about 
appropriate desires and appropriate beliefs.  Schick takes a pluralist, subjectivist line.  SCHICK, supra 
note 107, at 117–32; SCHICK, supra note 97, at 151–64.  We are more inclined to a kind of 
objectivist view: an appropriate understanding of a certain situation is one that would lead to the 
same decision/action as if the agent had all of her mental states activated.  In other words, we accept 
the normative force of utility maximization. 
 112. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 23 (1966).  Aristotle’s 
theory of perception and imagination provides a crude but not implausible account of understanding.  
According to Aristotle, people have a capacity for directly representing situations they encounter: 
perception.  ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S DE ANIMA BOOKS II AND III, at 418a3–6, 424a17–27 (J.L. 
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Appeal to understandings is part, albeit a neglected part, of our 
common-sense psychology.  Reflection on our everyday thoughts reveals 
the role that understandings play.  When someone sees a child in trouble, 
for example, she doesn’t usually think about her own monetary gain, 
despite the fact that she might be able to make some money in that 
circumstance.  Likewise, most of us rarely think about the harm we 
might do others when we drive.  We think rather about where we are 
going and what we’ll do when we get there.  We already know, in some 
sense, that we can affect the actions of others by framing their options in 
certain ways, i.e., by bringing to mind certain propositions rather than 
others.  Understandings play a familiar, if unheralded, role in our 
everyday thinking about behavior. 
It is fairly easy to adapt economic theory to accommodate Schick’s 
insights about understandings.113  Standard consumer theory starts with 
preferences.  It doesn’t say anything, however, about how these 
preferences result from an agent’s various interests.  Let us suppose that 
each of a person’s basic goals induces an interval ranking of actions.  
People act on subsets of their mental states, so they attend to only some 
of their basic interest rankings and some of their beliefs.  In a particular 
circumstance, the behavior-relevant probability weights will be those that 
are conditioned on salient beliefs and the action-guiding expected 
utilities are importance-weighted sums of the (numerical representations 
of the) rankings of salient desires.114 
                                                                                                                       
Ackrill ed., D.W. Hamlyn trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1968).  On his account, when someone 
perceives an object she registers certain of its properties.  The faculty of perception is closely related 
to the faculty of imagination.  Images are appearances as of this or that sort of thing.  Id. at 428a5–
15, 428a24–b9.  They are like perceptions in that they are representations of certain properties.  Id. at 
429b18–21, 431b2–11, 432a3–14.  Images are unlike perceptions, however, in that they are not 
closely tied to particular objects.  Imagination allows a person to represent more than she has already 
encountered.  Id. at 428a5–15, 429b10–18, 431b12–16.  When we represent the object of a mental 
state we have an image of the properties it involves, combined in the way it suggests.  Imagination, 
then, is how we entertain propositions.  When we entertain a proposition any attitudes toward it are 
likely to be activated.  Beliefs and desires that involve some of the same attributes are likely to 
become activated as well since the mind forms new images by recombination.  This account of how 
imagination works does suggest actual patterns of activation.  Aristotle’s theory of imagination 
provides an associationist account of understanding.  Mental states become activated because they 
are related in certain ways to mental states that are currently activated: their objects resemble one 
another, often occur together, are related as cause and effect, etc. 
 113. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schick’s insights. 
 114. The formal account is simple but a bit tedious.  Let A = {ai | ai is an action that the agent 
thinks she can perform}; D = {d | d is a basic desire}; and Rd be the binary preference relation over 
A provided by desire d ∈ D.  aiRdaj means that ai is at least as good as aj with respect to desire d.  
Each Rd is complete and transitive.  A function ud: A → ℜ (the real numbers) gives an expected 
utility assignment that numerically represents Rd such that ud(ai) ≥ ud(aj) iff aiRdaj.  Each ud(⋅) is 
unique only up to positive linear transformation.  Schick’s idea, in brief, is that people can be 
motivated by different proper subsets of their desires in different situations.  Let  N = {N | N is a 
situation}; C = {Rd | Rd for d ∈ D} is the set of preference rankings provided by someone’s basic 
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Appeal to understandings can account for the cases that create 
trouble for orthodox economics.  Schick’s understandings are similar to 
Kahneman-Tversky-Thaler-style framing in that both posit a 
preprocessing step where the inputs that influence behavior are specified.  
Both also handle the description-dependent preference cases in exactly 
the way Prospect Theory does—framing in terms of gains or losses from 
reference points is a kind of understanding.115  Traditional framing, 
however, misses a lot of what is useful in understandings because it still 
assumes that people consult all of their wants, interests, values, etc. when 
calculating gains or losses.  The understandings account goes beyond 
what either standard or behavioral economics is even willing to look at 
by allowing that people can act on a proper subset of their desires and 
beliefs.  It matters that the price I can sell my stock for is not merely $X, 
but $10 less than I was expecting, because this expectation brings certain 
values to mind.  Likewise, reflecting on people who are recently dead 
brings to mind a different set of beliefs and interests than thinking about 
people who are about to die.  This sort of appeal to different sets of 
mental states provides a potential explanation for the risk attitudes that 
are just built into Prospect Theory: losses make powerful fears salient; 
gains make fantasies salient but they are less powerful.  We know how to 
live with our status quo situation, at least in most cases.  It is easy, 
however, to imagine, and so fear, losses—we can think about what might 
happen when we lose the familiar.  It is less easy to imagine gains—the 
new is unfamiliar and we might not know how it would affect our lives.  
Likewise, it isn’t difficult to see how focusing on some considerations 
and not others would lead someone to divide up the space of outcomes 
being considered in a particular way. 
Appeal to understandings also promises to help solve a number of 
philosophical problems regarding human action, including puzzles about 
inner conflict and weakness of will.116  It provides, in particular, an 
                                                                                                                       
desires; Pow(C) = {Ci | Ci ⊆ C} is the set of subsets of C, i.e., the various combinations of rankings 
provided by basic desires.  S: N → Pow(C) is a function that specifies the set of preference relations 
activated in situation N.  Where multiple rankings are activated, the final evaluation is a weighted 
sum of the rankings provided by particular desires.  (This is a controversial claim, but it makes sense 
under certain conditions.)  See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 312–14 (1955).  In situation N a person 
will have the set of activated rankings S(N) = CN.  Her ranking of states will be given by uCN(·) = 
Σi∈CNwiui(·) where wi is the weight of the ith desire.  She will choose an aj ∈ A such that uCN(aj) ≥ 
uCN(ak) for all ak ∈ A.  Expected utilities depend on probability functions in the standard way.  Let B: 
N → sets of propositions be the function that specifies a set of salient propositions for each situation.  
The probabilities that a person assigns given that she takes action ai, P(· | ai), in situation N are P(· | ai 
& B(N)). 
 115. SCHICK, supra note 97, at 121–45; Jou et al., supra note 89, at 1–3, 9–11. 
 116. SCHICK, supra note 97, at 102–15. 
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attractive alternative to building “bounded willpower” directly into 
behavioral models.  After all, seeing willpower as a strictly limited 
commodity makes the opposite of weak will—stubbornness—something 
of a mystery.  And stubbornness in certain areas of life but not others is 
particularly perplexing.  If willpower is a general-purpose capacity that is 
limited or a feature of hyperbolic discounting of overall utility (or value), 
how can Steve be so resolute about avoiding Wal-Mart and so irresolute 
about his food intake?  A model that invokes understandings can account 
for both stubbornness and weak will.  Someone who sees a decision as a 
matter of principle will have access to all of the motivational 
reinforcement that principle has to offer.  Someone who is trying to lay 
off the doughnuts, on the other hand, would like to focus on the health 
risks of junk food.  He is used to focusing on the pleasure they bring, 
however, so he often sees them as pleasurable and proceeds to eat.117 
Paradoxically, perhaps, the understandings approach also has the 
potential to salvage more of orthodox economic theory than behavioral 
approaches.  Consider, for example, the “tunnel vision” or “bottom line” 
considerations induced by market contexts.  Within those contexts, 
standard economic theory fares pretty well.  It is only when further 
considerations (e.g., fairness, security) get involved that things begin to 
fall apart.  The approach of behavioral economics—building various 
behavioral effects straight into the standard models—both fails to capture 
the successes of orthodox accounts and, to some extent, sacrifices the 
intuitive connections between preferences and beliefs and the parts of 
models that represent them.  The successes and intuitive plausibility of 
standard models are better preserved by looking at which beliefs and 
interests are operating in a particular case.  And this is exactly what an 
understandings approach allows for: where a circumstance makes the 
sorts of things that economists look at salient, people act in the way 
economists predict; where a situation brings other issues to the 
                                                     
 117. This account, unlike behavioral approaches, handles even the most difficult cases, ones 
where a person performs an action that she acknowledges, even at the time she acts, is not the best 
overall.  The key is to realize that there is a distinction between access to a desire and activation of 
that desire.  Clearly, a person can have beliefs about her own desires.  People are able to make 
theoretical judgments about optimal actions, all things considered, using a process that models 
desires but doesn’t employ them.  This is how much deliberation about the future actually works.  
Beliefs about desires can be activated even when the desires they concern are not.  (Such cases are 
rare because having a belief about a desire would normally activate that desire.)  Having access to a 
desire via belief will not influence a person’s behavior in the way that activation of that desire 
would—an agent can conclude that a proposed action is suboptimal considering a certain desire, but 
not care because that desire is not activated, and so not part of her reason.  This seems to be precisely 
what happens.  When a person acts against what she acknowledges is a more important consideration 
than the one she is acting on, she will often report that she just isn’t feeling the pull of that 
consideration. 
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foreground, agents act in light of those issues.  An account that includes 
this sort of framing is able to account for both the cases that confound 
orthodox economics and the cases that confound behavioral economics. 
Behavioral and understandings approaches can provide competitive 
explanations for particular phenomena.118  In order to decide between 
approaches in such cases, research will need to be done.  That being said, 
it is important to see that adding understandings is not incompatible with 
the various behavioral moves.  We have good reason to expect that some 
combination of approaches will be required to account for the full range 
of behavioral complexity.  It is unlikely, for example, that beliefs are 
always adequately modeled by subjective probabilities, even when 
appropriately conditionalized.119  In order to handle the empirical 
evidence, economics will probably need to take a two-track approach: 
look for more common-sense resources (“top down”) and fit the 
descriptive models to the data (“bottom up”).120 
The concept of understandings helps in this regard by providing a 
top-down approach.  It can be formalized in a way consistent with 
standard economic theory and can therefore capture the successes of 
standard accounts.  At the same time, an understandings approach can 
also explain many of the empirical findings that drive the development of 
behavioral models including (but perhaps not limited to) Prospect 
Theory, Mental Accounting, and claims of bounded willpower.  Because 
it does so by providing an account of the underlying mechanism that 
motivates seemingly anomalous behavior, the approach may allow us to 
mediate among the various behavioral accounts, as well as help integrate 
them into standard models.  And, finally, an understandings approach 
may also explain cases that escape both standard and behavioral accounts 
(think of Orwell’s sniping or our tunnel vision in market contexts).  The 
result of all this—a more unified theory of behavior—would allow us to 
better predict and regulate human behavior. 
B. Possible Objections 
Social scientists are appropriately suspicious about views that claim 
too many advantages, especially when those advantages include the 
                                                     
 118. This is the case in much the way that different behavioral approaches can compete, as noted 
before.  See supra Part III.A. (describing the current state of behavioral economic theory as 
“scattered,” but recognizing two competing doctrines—Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting). 
 119. Prelec, supra note 75, at 497–99. 
 120. Russell B. Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, 
Behavioral Economics, and Evolutionary Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319, 320 (2001). 
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unification of contending accounts.  The worry is that the attribution of 
understandings is unconstrained: people can understand situations in any 
which way; since understandings aren’t directly observable, it isn’t 
possible to tell how someone understood her situation until you see what 
she actually did.  If this were correct, then adding understandings to 
economic theory wouldn’t generate any testable hypotheses about 
behavior.  It would, in fact, undermine the scientific credibility of 
economic approaches by adding a “fudge factor” to behavioral 
explanations.  Such unconstrained, post hoc attributions of 
understandings could rationalize any action, however off the wall, 
leaving no behavior that is inconsistent with the account.  Such an 
unfalsifiable theory would have no place in social science (some views 
really are too good to be true, or at least too good to be scientific truths). 
We see the charge of unfalsifiability as a pitfall to be avoided, and so 
a reason to be cautious in developing our account, but not a reason to 
abandon understandings.  It is important to see that all accounts of 
human behavior (or at least all of the remotely plausible ones) face the 
same sort of attack because they all appeal to mental states that aren’t 
directly observable.121  Any theory of human behavior would be 
unfalsifiable if it always avoided empirical evidence by changing its 
interpretation of these unobservable initial conditions.  Standard accounts 
avoid this mistake by constraining the attribution of unobservables.  An 
understandings-based approach does exactly the same thing.  But before 
we show how this works, it is useful to isolate the primary issue by 
clearing away some criticisms that often accompany the main charge. 
First, it is important to note that the unfalsifiability criticism can’t be 
an argument against appeal to unobservables, per se.  There is only a 
problem if unobservables are a “free variable” that would immunize a 
theory from empirical testing.  Some thinkers seem to suspect that 
attributions of not-directly-observable mental states are necessarily 
unconstrained.  Surely, however, an argument is needed here.  Such a 
view would rule out much of modern science since subatomic particles, 
astronomic structures, and the like aren’t directly observable.  It doesn’t 
follow that physicists are free to postulate quarks or black holes simply 
because they might come in handy.  Those entities are indirectly detected 
by appeal to the observations predicted by their home theories.  Theories 
as a whole imply a pattern of observations and so are subject to empirical  
 
                                                     
 121. Behaviorism avoids this issue, for example, but it is a poor account precisely because it 
doesn’t appeal to the internal states of agents.  External environment just isn’t the only determinant 
of behavior. 
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disconfirmation—the evidence may or may not be consistent with this 
pattern.122 
The need to constrain the attribution of mental states has tempted 
some social scientists to inter-define mental initial conditions and 
behavioral outputs (e.g., to hold that when an agent does y, it follows that 
she wanted to do y).  It is a mistake, however, to automatically fit 
unobservable inputs to observable outputs.123  Such attempts aren’t 
immune to falsification because attempts to accommodate different 
actions can lead to inconsistent attributions of unobservable states.  The 
problem here, rather, is the attempt to define causes in terms of their 
effects.  No action can be the sole determinant of its own (purported) 
causal antecedents.124 
After the fall of Behaviorism, no social scientist worth her salt has 
fixed the identity conditions of mental states in purely behavioral terms.  
A person’s behavior, of course, provides crucial evidence for the 
attribution of mental states to her, but it is overall patterns of behavior 
that serve this role.  The unobservability of particular mental states or 
processes ensures that no single bit of evidence will serve as a critical 
test for an account.  Still, it is possible for a pattern of evidence to be 
incompatible with the pattern predicted by a behavioral theory.125 
Second, it must be admitted that adding extra inputs to behavioral 
models does make it harder to test those models.  As we make more 
distinctions among circumstances, there are fewer relevantly similar 
situations to serve as test cases.126  Adding understandings to a 
behavioral theory does increase the difficulty in testing it because doing 
so increases the number of inputs to monitor.  Still, it is possible to 
                                                     
 122. As Quine puts it in his classic essay Two Dogmas of Empiricism, “our statements about the 
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.”  
Willard Van Ormand Quine, Two Dogmas of Empircism, in WILLARD VAN ORMAND QUINE, FROM 
A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20, 41 (1980). 
 123. This was a problem for Behaviorism—what counted as a stimulus was just whatever 
resulted in the relevant response.  Certain ways of understanding “revealed preferences” in economic 
models make this mistake too.  E.g., Daniel Hausman, Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game 
Theory, 16 ECON. & PHIL. 99, 101 (2000). 
 124. E.g., Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in DONALD DAVIDSON ESSAYS ON 
ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3–19 (1980). 
 125. The behavioral criticism of orthodox economics is a paradigmatic example of how this sort 
of test works. 
 126. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 51 (explaining that circumstances might change the relative 
value of two otherwise identical candy bars).  Distinguishing between contexts where someone is 
alone and where she has a date means that we can’t just observe things like convenience store 
behavior.  Of course, there is something different about each candy bar purchase, so there might be a 
“tendency [for] each option to become a unique alternative.”  AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND 
FREEDOM 170 (2002). 
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present agents with similar circumstances framed in similar ways, so it 
doesn’t make testing impossible.  In fact, the tendency to distinguish 
among situations is self-limiting where the theory in question constrains 
what counts as a relevant distinction.  As David Hausman notes with 
respect to standard economic theory, “[a]lternatives cannot be 
individuated non-arbitrarily without reference to subjective beliefs and 
wants.”127 
Finally, it is crucial to see that even a testable account can have 
adherents who are willing to make ad hoc assumptions about initial 
conditions just to fend off difficult data.128  An overeager physicist faced 
with some difficult data might, for example, postulate a quantum event 
without sufficient license.  Such a case would merely establish that this 
physicist refused to test her pet theory, not that physics itself is 
untestable.  This sort of “faith-based” adherence to an account speaks 
less to the legitimacy of the theory at issue than to the character of 
certain theorists, and it would be as unattractive with an understandings-
based account as it is with any other behavioral theory.  While there is 
certainly a pitfall here to avoid, adherence to an account need not be faith 
based.  The trick to avoiding this temptation is to have a proper respect 
for empirical evidence and to take challenges seriously.129 
We now return to the central issue with respect to unfalsifiability.  
Initially, it is important to remember that all of the standard accounts of 
human behavior face this criticism.  Common-sense appeal to desires and 
beliefs is sometimes derided because we could always come up with 
mental states that would rationalize any bit of behavior.130  Standard 
economic accounts, being founded on folk psychology, are subject to 
exactly the same criticism.131  Behavioral accounts come in for similar 
criticism, often from economists and their allies.132  These views escape 
the charges leveled at them because their attributions of beliefs, desires, 
preferences, reference points, etc., are constrained by empirical 
evidence.  Standard accounts of behavior appeal, in particular, to 
                                                     
 127. Hausman, supra note 123, at 111. 
 128. There are also critics who charge ad hoc-ery any time someone appeals to an unobservable 
state, whether there is a case to be made for doing so or not. 
 129. Critics have a role here as well—they need to make challenges seriously.  The fact that 
another account draws different distinctions than yours doesn’t, by itself, warrant a charge of 
unfalsifiability. 
 130. E.g., ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 36–43 (2d ed. 1995). 
 131. E.g., Jolls et al., supra note 86, at 1597–99. 
 132. Posner, for example, claims that “it is profoundly unclear what ‘behavioral man’ would do 
in any given situation.  He is a compound of rational and nonrational capacities and impulses.  He 
might do anything.”  Posner, supra note 10, at 1559. 
HAYDEN FINAL.DOC 6/25/2007  10:44:03 AM 
2007] LAW AND ECONOMICS AFTER BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 671 
unformalized common sense in order to constrain the inputs of more 
formal accounts. 
Common-sense desire and belief attributions are constrained by 
claims about human perceptions, attitudes, languages, etc. and folk-
psychological principles related to those facts.  People, for example, 
generally see things that occur before their eyes, and seeing is believing, 
ceteris paribus.  Likewise, people generally find the same sorts of things 
pleasant (e.g., sweets, gentle massages) and, ceteris paribus, they prefer 
pleasant things to unpleasant things.  People also tend to form new 
beliefs and desires in a way that conserves past beliefs and desires.  All 
of these principles combine (in complicated ways, at times) to constrain 
the beliefs and desires people form when exposed to new situations.  
Mental state attribution is not a “fudge factor” in folk psychology 
precisely because these principles rule out many attributions. 
Standard economic theory, as a (partly) formalized version of 
common sense, appeals to many of the same folk-psychological 
principles to constrain the attribution of preferences and subjective 
probabilities.  The tendency, in fact, is to adopt these sorts of constraints 
in their most abstract form.  Most economists assume both that belief-
forming processes are aimed at accurately representing the world and 
that they succeed.  As a result, they attribute to agents true beliefs about 
their situations, up to the limits of their perceptual capacities.  Likewise, 
most economists assume that people share a (mostly self-interested) set 
of desires, and that any idiosyncratic preferences can be discovered from 
past behavior.  All of this, of course, is just an abstract generalization 
(albeit a tendentious one) from folk psychology. 
Behavioral accounts also rely on common-sense notions in their 
attributions of behavioral effects.  The influence of the presentation of 
options on Prospect Theory reference points, for example, reflects a 
general principle about the role of testimony in belief formation.  Mental 
accounting, likewise, appeals to a very common-sense taxonomy of 
expenditure and credit categories. 
With regard to the account we are urging, understandings are like 
desires (beliefs, preferences, value functions, subjective probabilities, 
decision weights, etc.) in that they are implicitly characterized by the role 
they play in their home theory.133  This theory provides what is basically 
an associationist account of limited attention.  Understandings certainly 
aren’t free variables on this account—they are constrained by the 
character of the motivating cases.  One couldn’t, for example, understand 
                                                     
 133. E.g., SCHICK, supra note 97, at 70–71, 148–50. 
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a problem in a way she had never entertained before.  An agent is likely 
to understand a circumstance in terms of concepts and attitudes that she 
has strongly internalized or those to which she has recently been 
exposed.  Appeal to these sorts of common-sense principles about how 
people process information provides a set of (defeasible) constraints on 
the attributions of understandings.  James Druckman’s work on how 
“framing effects depend in critical ways on context” provides a good 
start at actually testing an understandings-based account.134  His 
emphasis on persuasion, counter-framing, and heterogeneous discussion 
suggests that environmental factors can broaden an agent’s 
understanding even to such an extent that she will approximate orthodox 
economic outcomes.135 
C. Some Examples 
A more unified approach would go a long way toward convincing 
legal policymakers to act upon the recommendations of economists, 
standard and behavioral.  The approach described here—which adds 
understandings to the basic desire-belief elements of standard 
economics—captures the successes of standard law and economics and 
addresses many of the concerns of the behavioral law and economists.  
That alone seems worth the price of admission.  But in addition, an 
understandings approach may also provide some insight into legal issues 
where current economic approaches, both standard and behavioral, leave 
us unsatisfied. 
Take, for example, voting, which has long been seen as a puzzle for 
standard economics.136  The puzzle isn’t the more familiar one of trying 
to explain low voter turnout, but its opposite—trying to explain why 
people bother to vote at all.  The problem is that the decision to cast a 
ballot appears irrational: the costs of voting (in time and effort) almost 
always exceed the benefits likely to flow from casting a single ballot (in 
large part because the chance of casting the tie-breaking vote—even in 
relatively small, closely-contested municipal elections—is 
mathematically miniscule).  Nevertheless, millions of people routinely 
make the economically pointless decision to vote. 
                                                     
 134. Druckman, Political Preference Formation, supra note 89, at 683. 
 135. Id. at 680–83. 
 136. The paradox was first noted almost a half century ago by Anthony Downs.  ANTHONY 
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260–62 (1957).  It continues to dog the literature.  
Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 
783 (1998).  Richard Hasen sets out a nice survey of the problem, and some of the proposed 
solutions, in Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (1996). 
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Voting is thus seized upon as an example of the failure of standard 
economic theory.137  It must be that people are not just narrowly self-
interested maximizers of their own utility; instead, their self-interest is 
“bounded.”138  Voting, like charitable giving and other selfless acts, 
demonstrates one of the flaws of the rational-actor basis of standard 
economics.  Beyond this insight, however, behavioral economics offers 
little guidance on resultant questions, such as why people choose to vote 
rather than engage in other types of selfless (or selfish) behavior. 
Standard economics, though, has a perfectly plausible comeback on 
this question: people vote because they like to vote.139  As discussed 
above, standard economic theory can accommodate other-regarding 
values and behavior; the “bounded self-interest” claim is no more 
convincing here than it is elsewhere.  Practitioners of law and economics 
then move onto subsidiary (although perhaps more useful) questions 
about changes in voting behavior, such as why voter turnout increases in 
closely contested elections or why voting increases with the wealth and 
education of the voter.140  Here, too, they have answers—people, for 
example, are more likely to vote in closely contested elections because 
information costs are lower.141  It is much easier to come by information 
about candidates and issues in highly competitive elections because 
there’s much more extensive campaigning and media coverage.  And 
perhaps the wealthy and well-educated vote in order to signal that they 
are cooperators in order to obtain cooperative returns from others in 
society: the signal only works if it is costly to vote, and the opportunity 
costs of voting rise with wealth and education.142 
An understandings approach should help us out a bit when trying to 
develop a framework that explains voting behavior.  On the issue of why 
                                                     
 137. E.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 68 
(1994); Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1489. 
 138. E.g., Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1099 n.219 (2002). 
 139. Posner, supra note 10, at 1554; see also William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory 
of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 28 (1968) (describing five different forms of 
satisfaction a voter might derive from voting).  This may appear to be a trivial explanation, but it is 
no more trivial than explaining a strong demand for donuts by reference to people’s desire for them 
(despite their unhealthy side effects).  While useful work with respect to voting and donuts requires 
more nuanced assessments of people’s preferences (to explain changes in demand, for example), the 
fact that there is some level of demand for either should not, by itself, be taken as evidence that 
economic theory is flawed. 
 140. These types of issues also drive most of the critique of standard economic theory with 
respect to voting.  Jolls et al., supra note 37, at 1489. 
 141. John G. Matsusaka, Explaining Voter Turnout Patterns: An Information Theory, 84 PUB. 
CHOICE 91, 95–105 (1995); Posner, supra note 10, at 1554–55. 
 142. Posner, supra note 136, at 784. 
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people vote, it may be, as standard economics holds, that voting is a 
rational thing to do: all things considered, some people value voting 
more than its demands on their time.  But it may also be that when 
people decide to vote, they aren’t considering all things; instead, they’re 
merely consulting a particular subset of their desires and beliefs, given 
their understanding of the current situation.  Election day may bring all 
sorts of beliefs and desires relating to civic virtue online, focusing 
people’s attention on voting.  An understandings approach is consistent 
with the standard answer.  At the same time, it is more plausible than the 
standard approach here because it isn’t necessary to assume that people 
decide to vote after considering all of their beliefs and desires (and all 
possible courses of action associated with them). 
An understandings approach also helps us on the subsidiary issues as 
well.  For example, on the question of why turnout increases in closely 
contested elections, it may be, as standard theory has it, that people are 
more likely to vote because information is cheap.  But it seems just as 
plausible that the extra campaigning and media coverage serve more as 
an attention-getting device than as a means to lower information costs.  
People vote because they’ve been reading, listening, watching, and 
talking about the election—they are focused on the election.  To be sure, 
they also come to the polls armed with some extra, relatively low-cost 
information about the candidates and the issues.  But there’s nothing 
inconsistent about adopting both a standard account and an 
understandings approach when trying to fully understand behavior.  
Indeed, under our approach, one would expect that the fundamental 
question to be answered when analyzing any kind of unexpected 
behavior is whether it was motivated by a new belief, a new desire, or a 
new understanding of the situation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Standard economic theory has provided a great deal of insight into 
existing law and guidance for legal policymaking.  And the law and 
economics movement had a number of successes, especially in areas 
involving the regulation of market behavior like antitrust and 
environmental law.  But most of its significant work, involving relatively 
straightforward applications of economic theory, has now been 
completed.  At this point, law and economics scholars are left to filling in 
doctrinal interstices and, significantly, attempting to explain empirical 
results that appear to contradict some of law and economics’ most 
fundamental precepts.  As Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen aptly put 
it, it is as though “[t]he law-and-economics movement has suffered from 
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the truthfulness of one of its most important postulates: the law of 
diminishing marginal returns.”143 
At this stage of its development, the value of behavioral law and 
economics lies in its potential.  The empirical findings of behavioral 
economics are sufficiently robust for us to conclude that some of the 
assumptions of standard economic theory are mistaken.  Now the 
problem is figuring out how the ever-expanding list of heuristics, biases, 
and norms interact with each other (and with standard accounts).  In 
other words, there is a distinct need to develop a unitary theory of 
behavior in order to move forward. 
We believe that adding the concept of understandings to the basic 
desire-belief machinery of economics is the kind of top-down approach 
that could help lead to the development of a more complete theory of 
human behavior.  This is, in part, because it can be formalized in a way 
that is consistent with standard economic theory.  At the same time, it is 
capable of capturing some of the empirical results that drive some of the 
more prominent behavioral models.  In any case, it represents a step in 
the right direction, toward a more unified (and empirically sound) 
economic theory.  And, as part of such a theory, it also stands a better 
chance of being operationalized into law. 
 
                                                     
 143. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 39, at 1053. 
